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In the Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah 
LaVAR PARK, I 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. 
M 0 0 R M A N MANUFACTURING j 
COMPANY, a corporation, 
Defendant and Appellant, 
and GAIL BARRON, 
- Defendant. 
Civil No. 7456 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
As the appellant in its brief has omitted some of the 
most essential facts, and has misconstrued and misstated others, 
the respondent feels compelled to submit a complete statement 
of facts. 
The plaintiff is a poultry farmer living in Riverton, Utah, 
and the defendant is a corporation with home offices in 
Quincy, Illinois, which manufactures feed for livestock and 
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poultry. Plaintiff bought poultry feed from the defendant 
to be fed in a particular manner. A large number of the 
chickens so fed died and the plaintiff sued to recover damages 
for breach of express or implied warranty. 
About Jan. 20, 1948, plaintiff bought and received 10,000 
white leghorn baby chicks one week old from Sales and 
Bourke's Hatcheries in California, and put them into his 
brooding pens on the west side of Redwood Road (R. 121-
122). In March, 1948, he sold about 2,250 of the young birds 
si:nce the maximum capacity of all his coops-East and West 
of Redwood Road-was not above 7,000 mature pullets (R. 180, 
198) . Before that time he had had some normal brooding 
losses among his chicks, and he had sold the roosters (R. 199-
200, 266-267). When the pullets were 2'l2 months old, a 
number of them died of chickenpox and tracheitis (R. 193, 
199), so that about the middle of April plaintiff's flock con-
sisted of about 6,400 three-month-old chickens (R. 180). 
To make room for the growing pullets, plaintiff sold 
all the older hens in the coops on the east side of the road in 
May, 1948, and washed and disinfected their coops (R. 122-
144). About June 1, he moved 2,850 of the young pullets 
over to the east side with the help. of a Mr. ·Cont.a; poultry. 
bqyer for the Utah Poultry· Company,. a very . experienced 
chicken man who had .handled "millions of chickens," his 
job being to "cull'1 chickens, that is select those hens which 
do 'not lay eggs and buy them as meat. By law, and the strict 
rules of his company, he was, not permitted to buy any diseased 
chickens (R. 304). As a result, and through his long years 
of experience, he had exceptional ability to recognize disease 
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in chickens. Mr. Conta testified that only the best layers were 
selected to be moved to the east side (R. 306) and that they 
were in good shape and had no diseases (R. 307-310). 
Up to that time plaintiff fed all his chickens a product 
of General }.fills, known as "Larro," and was satisfied with 
the results. This feed was a pre-ground "mash" containing 
the nutritional requirements for chickens, including protein 
and minerals, in ready-mixed form, with scratch grains in 
regulated quantities to be fed separately once a day. Mr. 
Wood, a representative of General Mills, explained at the 
trial that under their feeding program the scratch grains-
wheat, or wheat combined with oats or corn-are progressively 
withheld from the chickens the higher their level of egg 
production. At 75ro production, for example, the chickens 
receive less grain than when the egg yield is lower, or when 
they just start to lay. He said that chickens have a natural 
preference for the grains which must be withheld from them 
because with increasing production the protein requirement 
increases and the carbohydrate requirement decreases (R. 362-
365). 
Early in June, 1948, plaintiff met Gail Barron, salesman 
for defendant Moorman Manufacturing Company. The first 
business he had with him was a day or so later when Barron 
came to plaintiff's place and sold him some minerals to stop 
picking in his young birds. This picking was the ordinary 
feather picking which occurs in all sizeable flocks from time 
to time and is distinguished from "pick-outs" or "cannibalism" 
which afflicted the hens on the east side after using defendant's 
feed. Conta testified that these conditions are not the same, 
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that they "are two" (R. 340). The picking did not concern 
plaintiff very much and later cleared up by itself so that at 
the time when he started to feed mintrate the picking was 
"very nominal." (R. 181). 
When Barron came to see plaintiff, his main purpose was 
to sell him a new self-feed concentrate called "Poultry Min-
trate 40," which his company had just put out. Barron ex-
plained that plaintiff could feed Mintrate right along with 
oats, that its use would eliminate the need for the more expen-
sive commercial pre-ground mash or obtaining grinding and 
mixing machines to mix and grind up the feed himself. 
Plaintiff had never heard of this product before and was 
naturally skeptical at first, knowing how easily chickens can 
be upset and thrown off egg production. 
Mr. Barron visited plaintiff almost every day in the fore 
part of June, 1948, and once spent practically the whole day 
with him in an attempt to persuade him to change to the new 
feeding plan. He told Park that numerous successful experi-
ments with Mintrate on the self-feed method had been made, 
that it had been proved equal or superior to any feeding 
method now on the market, and that no less than 657o pw· 
duction-65 eggs per 100 hens a day-had in all cases been 
achieved. He added that there had been better results than 
that, that 9070 production had been reached in at l~ast one 
instance, and that plaintiff would in any event obtain a mini-
mum lay of 657o on the self feed plan (R. 126-127). Barron 
also said that chickens on their plan would not moult for the 
full 15-months laying period (R. 408-409). 
Barron showed plaintiff some literature which impressed 
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him (R. 190), p~rticularly a pamphlet (Exhibit A) entitled 
the '2\r\V, EASY, NO J\liX, SELF-FEED CONCENTRATE" 
which states in red and black advertising, among other things: 
"Compared with the average laying mash-three times as much 
minerals-twice as much protein-half as much needed -
L1Iintrate 40 and your grain=good results- contains only 
what you need, but can't raise--lower cost per bird-all the 
advantages of a concentrate \vithout the work, fuss or muss" 
(emphasis supplied). On the large inside page the pamphlet 
gives detailed instructions on "How to use the EASY, NO 
MIX, SELF-FEED WAY new feeding method for laying hens 
-no grinding or mixing" (R. 137). Further down the pam-
phlet states: 
"When not set up for grinding or mixing, the self-
feed way described above may be preferred. It has 
been successfully used by thousands of Moorman cus-
tomers.·'' (Emphasis supplied). 
The self-feed plan which Barron specifically remommend-
ed to plaintiff (R. 127, 143) is based on the idea that the 
chickens will be able to balance their own diet. They have 
before them at all times the mintrate concentrate in one 
feeder and whole oats in another feeder and have free choice 
in the amounts of each they wish to consume. In addition they 
receive scratch grains (not oats, usually wheat) once a day, 
and alfalfa hay (R. 137). 
On his visits to plaintiff, Barron was once or twice ac-
companied by a Mr. McArthur, the District Sales Manager for 
defendant company. McArthur was present when the state-
ment concerning 65lf0 production and other statements as to 
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the supenonty of the Mintrate plan were made (R. 134). 
Plaintiff finally agreed to order some mintrate, but only enough 
for .1,250 chickens (R. 189, 26}-264). That was before a 
written guaranty was discussed (R. 263-264, 410). 
A day or so later plaintiff and Barron began talking about 
the possibility of entering into a written agreement under which 
plaintiff would receive definite assurance that he would not 
lose any money through the use of the 11intrate plan (R. 
411) . In case such a contract could be obtained, plaintiff 
agreed to feed Mintrate to 2,850 instead of the original 1,250 
chickens. Mr. Barron needed some time to contact his superior 
to make sure that he had authority to enter into such an agree-
ment (R. 411). But in the meantime, on the strength of 
Barron's promise to get the guaranty, if he could, plaintiff 
started, about June 11, to feed Mintrate to all the 2,850 
chickens on the east side of Redwood Road (R. 189). 
This arrangement made it possible for plaintiff to carry 
out a clear-cut test to compare the two feeds and feeding 
method with respect to chickens of the same breed, the same 
age and hatch which were receiving the same care, housing, and 
sanitation, and were comparable in numbers. (Plaintiff then 
had 3,491 "Larro" birds, all on the west side of the road). 
On the basis of this test Park intended to decide which of the 
two feeding methods to use in the future (R. 411). 
Following the instructions of defendant, plaintiff gradually 
changed over to the mintrate plan, at first mixing it with his 
regular feed and increasing the portion each day until at the end 
of 10 days, about June 21, the east side chickens were com-
pletely mintrate-fed (R. 142). 
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In the meantime, 11r. Barron had contacted the District 
Sales Manager McArthur. Barron testified as follows: 
"A.- Yes, I called him, as I remember it. I called him 
on the phone and explained to him that Mr. Park 
would place 2,850 birds on our feeding plan. if 
the company would insure that he would not lose 
any money through it. 
Q. What did he say? 
A. At that time he said he could not tell me; that he 
was quite sure the company would, because they 
were interested in getting poultry business in this 
area; and that he could not okeh it without check-
ing further on it. 
Q. Did you later have a conversation about this same 
matter? 
A. About a day following, Mr. McArthur contacted 
me and told me . . . 
A. (continued). That 11r. McCullough had approv-
ed the guaranty and that we could guarantee that 
he would get the same results or have the same 
production rate, the same money return from his 
chickens as from the chickens on the other side" 
(R. 412). 
Later, l\1r. Barron testified, 11cArthur personally went 
with him to plaintiff's place and told plaintiff who asked him 
about the guaranty that "Mr. McCullough had approved it, 
that the company was behind it'' (R. 413). McArthur's testi-
mony is to the same effect. He said that he called McCullough, 
the Sales Manager for the states of Utah, Idaho, and parts of 
Nevada, and was told by him that he could guarantee the 
product, that the company "would equal the production of 
any competitive feed" on the self-feed method (R. 286). 
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Mr. Barron also testified that Mr. McCullough personally 
recruited him as a salesman in the middle of May, 1948, when 
the company was getting ready to open up the Utah area for 
the new-type feed; that McCullough pointed out to him the 
selling points of Mintrate 40 and particularly the attractiveness 
of the self-feed method to farmers; "that the program would 
eliminate and was eliminating many of the standard types of 
feeding; that it would eliminate the need for getting it through a 
mash house and eliminate the need or necessity for mixing the 
grain. The farmer himself could feed the grain and the protein 
direct to the chicken ... "; that McCullough told him further 
that "if fed on this method the chickens would not ever lay under 
65lfo"; that the method was new but would be appealing to 
any farmer, and that "it would eliminate the sales resistance 
to the program" (R. 398-400). Later, in sales meetings in 
June, Gail Barron was further instructed along the same lines, 
and McCullough explained to the salesmen that chickens on 
the self-feed method would not moult for the entire 15-months 
laying period (R. 400). See also McArthur's testimony (R. 
282-285). 
The written agreement was executed on June 19, 1948 
(Exhibit C, set out in full at R. 141) . 
At the time the agreement was executed, the east side 
chickens were already on the Mintrate feeding plan and were 
just starting to lay. Plaintiff did not start to count egg collec-
tions East and West and to record them on his eggcharts until 
about June 20. It was not before July 3 that egg production 
was high enough to gather eggs twice daily (R. 207, 211). For 
10 
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about two weeks thereafter the results were good. Plaintiff 
testified as follows: 
"I would say maybe the mintrate might have had 
a little the better of it, for one per cent, when Mr. 
Mittelberg came out there, and they got up to 63V2 
per cent is the highest I ever did get out of them, out 
of the pullets. That should have been around the 
middle. of July. Then they started to dropping off" 
(R. 144-145). 
About the same time plaintiff noticed that the Mintrate 
birds were losing weight. He told Barron about it and Barron 
told Mr. Mittelberg, the 1fanager of the Service Department 
of defendant who had come out from the head office in Illinois. 
Mr. Mittelberg went to see plaintiff on July 19. He testified 
that' the birds looked good and the egg production was just 
about the same as that of his other birds (R. 797). He gave 
plaintiff some advice on how to improve their weight (R. 418-
419). 
About the same time Barron asked plaintiff to recommend 
the feed to other farmers, but plaintiff declined because the 
chickens were losing weight (R. 150-151) . Plaintiff weighed 
some of the chickens, put them on scales and found the 
Mintrate birds lh to % pound lighter than the other birds 
on the average (R. 151). Mr. Wood, and a Mr. Bryson, who 
bought eggs from plaintiff during this period, confirmed the 
fact that the I\1intrate birds were getting thin (R. 357, 245). 
A little later plaintiff became disturbed about the amount 
of picking in the mintrate pens. He testified that there was 
"a terrible lot of cannibalism," that many chickens were 
11 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
picked to death (R. 144). The worst outbreak started about 
July 24. Plaintiff saved many by painting them with a salve, 
but many died (R. 149). Mrs. Park and Mr. Miller, plaintiff's 
hired man, testified to the same effect. Mr. Barron testified: 
"Q. Coming back to Mr. Park, when was the next time 
you saw Mr. Park? 
A. I think after that, the day of the 25th or 26th of 
July. It was just after the 24th. 
Q. What was the occasion ? 
A. He called me out there. 
Q. What did you see when you got there? 
A. Mr. and Mrs. Park and the hired man, they were 
attempting to stop chickens from killing each 
other on the east side of the road. They had an 
outbreak for about three days there; he was com-
pletely discouraged with the feed. 
Q. What did you tell him? 
A. I told him I would notify the company of his in-
tention and see if there was not a solution to the 
problem. 
Q. Did you ask him to keep feeding or stop feeding? 
A. I asked him to keep feeding. 
Q. Did he keep feeding? 
A. He did. 
Q. Did you notice what they were doing. 
A. They were picking each other. 
Q. What was the result of this picking, that you could 
see? 
A. There were deaths, a number of deaths; and of 
12 
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his entire 2,850 birds I would say a good 1j3 · of 
them were pain~d.... They had been picked or 
picked at, and he was continually painting them 
to stop it. 
Q. Did you yourself see any of the dead birds? 
A. Yes. 
Q. How many? 
A. I would not know. I did not count them. There 
was in one pen I counted at one runway about 
fifteen birds newly dead, and in Pen No. 1-
Q. Can you point that out? 
.\A. The 6-foot runway there, they were in that runway 
betwe-en Pen No. 1 and 2. 
Q. About how many? 
A. I would say about fifteen. 
Q. Were there any dead chickens anywhere else? 
A. Every runway had dead chickens, but some had 
more than others. I did not count them." (R. 
420-421). 
At the same time many of the mintrate birds went off 
egg production and became culls while the Larro birds layed up 
to S57o (R. 148). The culls were bought as meat by Tom 
Conta (R. 156), while the chickens that had died had to be 
thrown out as garbage. Plaintiff testified as follows: 
·'They were giving me a bad time, and I told Gail 
something had to be done. I said I had better take 
them off this feed. He said 'No, you better give them 
a fair cqance.' 
Q. What did he say to you? 
13 
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A. Well, he said to leave them on this plan and we 
·would see. We had to give them a fair trial. So 
· I figured, well, I would have to give them a fair 
trial. If I had to have any bad business with 
the company, I would have to give them a fair trial, 
so I l~ft them on it. I finally took them off. That 
is, I started to take them off before Dr. Sturdy 
came out. I think I started on Saturday, and they 
came out on Monday." (R. 150). 
Plaintiff said he thought he started to go back to the Larro 
feed about August 18, that he changed back gradually taking 
about ten days (R. 148). He did not ask a disinterested veteri-
narian to look at the chickens bceause a Dr. Sturdy, the defend-
ant's own veterinarian flew out to Utah for the special purpose 
of examing plaintiff's flock (R. 15 3) . McArthur testified as 
to these occasions as follows: 
''Mr. Barron called me during the night and told 
me that there was a lot of trouble with Park's 
chickens and I was down there very early the next 
morning and went through the coops and looked 
the chickens over. That is when I first saw the 
written guaranty. 
Q. About when was that -do you know? 
A. I would say it was some time during August. 
Q. Was that the fore part or the latter part of August? 
A. I could not definitely say as to date. 
Q. By the way, you said you came down and examined 
the chickens? 
A. Yes. 
Q. What did you see? 
14 
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A. I saw a lot of dead chickens and a lot of chickens 
picking badly. 
Q. What did you do after you had examined the 
chickens and knew about this guaranty? 
A. I went through all of the pens and looked the 
situation over, all of the pens where the chickens 
were being fed mintrate, then, on the opposite 
side of the street, after making a comparison I 
went back to Ogden and called Mr. McCullough 
and reported to him just exactly what I had seen, 
and told him that I thought it was quite serious 
and that he definfiitely should get some action. 
He instructed me to immediately call Mr. Hulsen, 
the sales manager, in Quincy, Illinois, and I did 
that. 
Q. What did you say to Mr. Hulsen? 
A. I told him approximately what I had told Mr. Mc-
Cullough. I told him that the chickens were dy-
ing, that they were losing weight, and that they 
were picking bad; that as far as I knew, the feed 
had been fed in accordance with our instructions; 
that I had been checking the particular operation 
as closely as I could and still attend to my other 
work. At that time I had been in Mr. Park's place 
-that was the fourth trip, I think. 
Q. You had discovered the manner in which he fed 
his chickens? 
A. I had very definitely observed it, and I was very 
much concerned about the deal. 
Q. What was the name--Hulsen? What did he say? 
A. He told me that the company would get someone 
out here immediately. 
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Q. Did they get someone out here? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Who came out? 
A. Dr. Sturdy. 
Q. When did you first see Dr. Sturdy? 
A. I met him at the airport. 
Q. Where did you go from there? 
A. I took him to the hotel, and the next morning I 
brought him up to Mr. Park's place (R. 287-288). 
Mr. McArthur then relates how Dr. Sturdy examined the 
chickens, and that one remark of Dr. Sturdy's struck him as 
being unusual, and therefore he remembered it. He said: 
rrw e are just starving these chickens to death on all the feed 
they want." (R. 290). 
Plaintiff and Mr. Barron and Mr. Miller all testified that 
they heard Dr. Sturdy make the same remark after he dissected 
two chickens, cut open their gizzards and found them to be 
full of oat fibre (R. 154-155, 422-424, 523-524). Mr. Barron 
testified: 
"A. He said that the gizzard was full of hulls, which 
he showed us. There was nothing else in the 
gizzard except oat hulls, and he said that the 
chicken was starving to death, that he thought it 
was full. The full gizzard made the chicken feel 
as if it were full, and as a result it was not eating 
enough. It was gradually starving." (R. 424). 
Mr. Miller, who was particularly interested in poultry dis-
eases because he was studying about them at school, asked 
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j 
Dr. Sturdy about leukosis and Dr. Sturdy said it did not show 
in these chickens, and he also told him that there was no 
pullorum or coccidia, nor any other disease (R. 52;,..524). 
1Iiller stated: 
"All he said was: '\Ve have been starving these 
chickens to death. They feel like they are full, getting 
plenty to eat, but they are not.' " (R. 524). 
Dr. Sturdy himself testified as a witness for the defendant 
company. He is a Doctor of Veterinary Medicine and em-
ployed by defendant as Research Veterinarian, also has some 
duties in connection with the company's Experimental Farm. 
\Y/hile the witness obviously avoided committing himself as 
to the cause of plaintiff's difficulties, he did admit that the 
chickens on the east side "just did not look too good" as 
comp~red with the Larro birds (R. 717, 728-729), that there 
were "quite a few culls" among them, and that they were 
light in weight (R. 727), and that the consumption of too 
many oats in the self-feed program may have been the cause of 
the difficulties (R. 73~-734). He testified: 
"~lhen I opened up the crop and gizzard I said 
to 1,1r. Park: 'There is your trouble. That bird 
is overeating oats. No wonder your birds are not 
doing any better! 
Q. That was your opinion at that time? 
A. Yes." (R. 732, see also 719). 
Dr. Sturdy looked for illnesses among the flock and testi-
fied as to all the disease possibilities at great length. He said 
that there was no pullorum (R. 718, 727), nor coccidia (R. 
17 
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719, 727) nor any other disease that he could positively diag-
nose. He suspected that there may have been a few cases of 
big liver or other form of leucosis, but he was not certain 
(R. 743), but added that there might be some cases of big 
liver in a flock without affecting the other birds and that this 
disease is entirely different from Newcastle which spreads 
rapidly and usually hits all the coops on one farm (R. 729-
730). Dr. Sturdy testified that he was going on to California 
to investigate some similar complaints (R. 735), and that on 
other poultry farms in Utah that he had visited egg production 
was lower on mintrate than on other feeding programs (R. 
739). 
After his trip to California, on August 28, Dr. Sturdy 
returned and visited plaintiff's farm again (R. 725), and by 
that time several other officers of defendant, including Mr. 
Mittelberg and Mr. Garrison, the Regional Sales Manager 
for the Pacific area, had also arrived in Salt Lake City because 
of their great concern over the progress of plaintiff's feeding 
experiment (R. 294, 459). There were some efforts made by 
defendant to come to a settlement with plaintiff (R. 458-461), 
but no adjustment finally materialized. 
There was a large amount of additional testimony to 
the effect that the Larro birds were doing well while the 
mintrate birds went down in egg production, had many more 
culls, more deaths and the quality of the eggs produced was 
inferior (Mittelberg R. 807-808, Wood 356-357, 359, Keith 
Bryson R. 244, 245, 247, John Miller R. 526-527). This 
was apart from the testimony of other poultry men in Utah 
18 
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who had similar unsuccessful experiences with the Mintrate 
self-feed program. 
There was no question but that plaintiff fed Mintrate strict-
ly in accordance with defendant's instructions. The evidence 
was also undisputed that apart from the difference in nutri-
tion, the Mintrate and Larro chickens received absolutely 
equal care, housing and sanitation, and that they were of the 
same age and heredity. In that connection defendant's expert 
witness, Dr. C. I. Draper, head of the Department of Poultry 
of the Utah State Agricultural College, testified that where a 
farmer has chickens all of the same age, raised under the same 
conditions up to the age of 5 months, and then they are sepa-
rated, but they continue to be under the same management, 
with the same type of coop and the same amount of space and 
the same care in all respects, except that one group receives 
a different type of feed, and that group develops severe pick-
ing and cannibalism while the other group does not, then it 
follows as a logical conclusion that the cannibalism was caused 
by a nutritional deficiency (R. 773-774). 
See also R. 726 showing that in Government Bulletin No. 
1652 "Cannibalism," is listed under nutritional diseases. Dr. 
Draper and Dr. Sturdy, however, call cannibalism not a disease, 
but a "vice," not caused by any organism (R. 726, 758). 
Plaintiff does not claim that there are any deleterious sub-
stances in the composition of the Mintrate feed itself. Dr. Dra-
per testified, however that because a feed has a certain constitu-
ency that does not necessarily mean it is good for the bird (R. 
766, see also Dr. Elmslie's testimony R. 644-645). Dr. Draper 
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stated that the feeding program for chickens must be varied 
according to the kind of the bird, its size, and the percentage 
of its egg production (R. 768-770). The Mintrate self~feed 
program does not allow for any such variation, particularly 
not in relation to the level of egg production. That was ad-
mited by Mr. Mittelberg (R. 816-817). 
As to the beneficial qualities of oats in feeding chickens, 
there appears. to be a difference of opinion among the experts 
(R. 734). Oats have more fiber than other grains and are 
therefore less digestible for chickens (R. 820, 760-761). All 
experts agree, however, that chickens fed on too many oats 
or oats alone will deteriorate and produce very few eggs 
(R. 734-735, 757, 648). Also, confined poultry such as chickens 
on the larger farms of the west have different nutritional 
requirements than the smalle:: family-sized or farm flocks of 
the middle west which can run freely about the green of 
the country (R. 815, 821). 
The self-feed method itself is not generally recommended 
for chickens. Dr. Draper testified that he had not seen it used 
in Utah and that the Utah State Agricultural College does not 
recommend it (R. 767). Dr. Miner, also of the Utah State 
Agricultural College, states in a letter that the "cafeteria 
method" of feeding can be carried to extremes, that it has to 
be used with judgment and skill, and that for most individuals 
the mixed rations are preferable (R. 762). And Mr. 
Wood, representative of General Mills Farm Service Divi-
sion, testified that his cotnpany does not recommend a 
free choice self-feed program for chickens above the age 
of 20 weeks (R. 362, 382). 
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The defendant itself evidently began to have doubts as 
to the appropriateness of the self-feed method. In September, 
1948, after the occurrences at plaintiff's farm, it cautioned 
against recommending a change to the self-feed method (R. 
4;4-435, 809). 
According to the testimony of Dr. Elmslie, Director of 
Research of defendant, Poultry Mintrate 40 was not adopted 
by the company before the fall of 1947 (R. 623, 634). It is 
the first chicken concentrate of the company intended to be 
used on the self-feed plan, the older Poultry Mintrate 38 
having been developed for mash feeding only (R. 65 3). Dr. 
Elmslie, who also supervises the 180-acre experimental farm 
of defendant, could not point to any experiment of the com-
pany that had been made with White Leghorn chickens on 
the self-feed method although they are the most widely-used 
laying chickens in the United States. There also had not 
been any self-feed experiments before the fall of 1947 with 
any other breed of chickens except one with an "Austrowhite" 
breed and one with a "High Line" breed. Only one of these 
experiments was on a comparative basis, but involved only 
two pens of 70 birds, and the other one covered only one pen of 
75 chickens (R. 634, 635). The witness did not have any 
information or figures on the results of these experiments, 
neither did Mr. Mittelberg (R. 825). That was the extent of 
the research and testing of the new product before it was 
released to the public. The company's main business seems 
to be feeds for livestock. It sells a hog mintrate, a cow 
mintrate, a beef cattle mintrate, and mineral feeds for horses 
and sheep (R. 626-628). Poultry Mintrate 40 is intended 
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for turkeys as well as chickens (R. 628), but for turkeys, Dr. 
Elmslie said, they do not recommend the self-feed method 
(R. 632). 
As a matter of fact, there is not the slightest evidence in 
the whole record that there had ever been an adequate or 
proper testing of the Mintrate feed or the self-feed method 
by the company or any one else indicating that satisfactory 
results could be obtained when fed to a larger flock. Apparently, 
the plaintiff was the first person to carry out a full scale experi-
ment on a comparative basis, which test proved conclusively 
that the Mintrate, when fed on the self-feed method, was a 
dismal failure. 
Plaintiff did not attempt to recover damages for all the 
losses of his Mintrate birds, but asked solely for compensation 
of his relative or comparative loss, that is, any losses in excess 
of those experienced by his Larro birds. He concedes that 
there are certain risks involved in the chicken business which 
are, however, due to modern advances in the science of poultry 
farming, not nearly as unavoidable and unpredictable as 
appellant attempts to show. Since he experienced some normal 
losses among his Larro birds and would in all probability 
have had about the same amount of losses in the Mintrate 
birds had it not been for the fact that he changed feeds, 
plaintiff, in fairness to the defendant, did not include 
them in his claim for damages. Normal loss factors, such 
as the outbreak of Newcastle disease which struck both flocks 
in November (R. 208), not in September or October as appel-
lant states, have thus been automatically excluded from con-
sideration in the computation of plaintiff's damages. The New-
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castle disease caused the Larro, as well as the l\1intrate birds 
to go off production for several weeks so that consequently 
hardly any egg losses were included for the Mintrate birds 
during that period. The egg charts which were introduced 
in evidence substantiate these facts. (See R. 208) . 
Plaintiff made several diffetent counts of his birds, 
on both sides of the road, one in June, when the Mintrate 
program was started, one in the beginning of October, and 
one in the beginning of December, 1948. He had complete 
figures of the number of deaths, the number of culls, and 
the amount of eggs produced by the Mintrate birds as well 
as the Larro birds. In his complaint, he prayed for $6,775.50 
as damages on his first cause of action, $~·,522.25 as damages 
on his second cause of action, and $4,978.75 on his third cause 
of action. He asked for damages up to October 31, 1949 
which was the end of the ·laying season of the damaged Rock. 
He had found it impractical to replace part of the Mintrate 
flock before, for the reason that, as will be discussed under 
Point VI of this brief, piecemeal or partial replacements with 
younger pullets not ready for egg production-the only chickens 
then available on the market-would have upset the annual 
cycle of his poultry business. The Court, however, did not 
permit him to prove any losses ·beyond December 9, 1948 
(R. 5 38) . As a result, and as a result of the many deductions 
from his proved losses which plaintiff was required to make 
(see Exhibit V, and R. 859), the maximum recovery allowed 
was reduced to $2,231.34 which the jury returned as the total 
amount of its verdict. 
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ARGU11ENT 
POINT NO. I 
THE CASE WAS PROPERLY SUBMITTED TO THE 
JURY UPON )'HE THEORY OF EXPRESS WARRANTY. 
A. There was an affirmation of fact constituting an express 
warranty. 
The Court instructed the jury that if the defendant had 
stated that J\iintrate on the self-feed plan had been tried 
numerous times, and that chickens fed Mintrate on that plan 
had had no less than 65<fo production of eggs, they might find 
that to constitute a warranty. (Instructions No. 9 and 13). 
The record shows that the percentage of production is 
a very important, if not the most important, figure in the 
business of a poultry man depending for his livelihood upon 
the production of his hens. Plaintiff appeared to be ever-
conscious of that percentage and seemed to have it figured 
out every day upon every gathering of the eggs. When Mr. 
l\1ittelberg went to see him on July 19, plaintiff told him that 
the Mintrate birds on that day were up to 631h<yo, and that 
the other chickens were 1 <fo below that. A few days later 
he found that the percentage of lay had gone down on the 
Mintrate side. Later, plaintiff states that the Larro chickens 
achieved 85<f0 and held that high figure for some time. Mr. 
\V ood of General Mills also testified in terms of percentages 
of egg production. The 65% statement therefore had a very 
definite, all-important, mathematically ascertainable meaning 
which left no doubt as to its significance in the mind of any 
egg producer. It can therefore· not be regarded in one class 
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with such statements as that a car will last 50 years or that 
cars of that type had lasted 50 years, or that a certain product 
will give soro more satisfaction. 
\Vhile the Court limited the jury to this one statement, 
it must of course be considered in the setting of all the re-
lated claims for the new free choice feed that were made, 
and the situation plaintiff found himself in when pressed to 
purchase an unknown product. Particular attention is called 
to the pamphlet Barron showed the plaintiff prior to the sale 
(Exhibit A) wherein it is stated that the Mintrate self-feed 
way of feeding chickens "has been successfully used by thou-
sands of Moorman customers." 
It is submitted that the representation with respect to 
tl1e 65)0 egg yield, taken alone as well as in its context amounts 
to an express warranty, and the jury was justified to so find. 
In Studeba.~er Bros. Co. of Utah v. Anderson, 50 Utah 
319, 167 Pac. 663 (1917), the Court held a statement by the 
sell~r that a car is "as good as new and ... fit for the use 
of the carrying of passengers to and from the New Grand 
Hotel ... " to be not merely an opinion of the salesman but 
an express warranty. The Court stated: 
"We think from the foregoing statements made con-
cerning the particular car in question something more 
was to be implied, as a matter of law, than that the 
plaintiff could sell the defendants a junk pile for an 
automobile and then escape liability therefor by saying 
such statements were only 'seller's talk.' " 
Again, in Sumrners v. Provo Foundry & Machine Co., 53 
Utah 320, 178 Pac. 916 (1919), the Supreme Court of Utah 
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held in an action for the breach of warranty in the sale of a 
Hudson car that 
"there was a warranty as to the car being free from 
defects as to material and workmanship, but we re-
gard the statement that the car would do whatever 
any other Super-Six would do as also amounting to 
an express warranty, and not mere 'seller's talk,' or an 
expression of opinion." 
In Jorgensen v. Gessell Brick Co., 45 Utah 31, 141 Pac. 
460 ( 1914) the Court held a representation that brick is "first 
class-wire-cut, white brick" to be an express warranty of the 
quality and color of the brick. 
And in Nielson v. Hermansen, 109 Utah 180, 166 Pac. 
( 2d) 5 36 ( 1946), it was held that the question as to whether 
statements were made regarding the kind of wheat sold which 
might have induced the plaintiff to buy it, should have been 
put to the jury to find whether they constituted an express 
warranty. The court said that 
"where it appears doubtful whether or not the state-
ment is one of fact or opinion and therefore whether 
there is a warranty, the question should be left to the 
trier of the facts.'' 
See also Stringfellow v. Botterill Auto Co., 63 Utah 56, 
221 Pac. 861, ;4 A.L.R. 533, holding a statement that a 
car is a 1922 model to be a warranty, and Beaver Drug Co. 
v. Hatch, 61 Utah 597, 217 Pac. 695 ( 1923) which held that 
a representation that certain stock would inventory $4,000 
was not an expression of opinion. 
26 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
:~ \..: In contrast to the facts of these cases, Detroit Vapor 
Stoz,.e Co. z·. W eeter Lumbet· Co., ( 1923) 61 Utah 503, 2! 5 
Pac. 995 relied on by appellant presents a typical case of "puff-
ing" or "dealer's talk." All that was said to the buyer of 
certain stoves was that the buyer would have no difficulty in 
reselling them to his customers, that they would "sell like 
hot cakes." 
The Court stated: 
"For a dealer to say that the article he offers for sale 
'will sell like hot cakes' may have a tendency to induce 
an ardent lover of hot cakes to make an improvident 
purchase, but it affords him no grounds of action or 
defense if the statement proves to be false." 
No case has been found in Utah or any other jurisdiction 
relating to express warranties made in the sale of feed for 
chickens. However, there is one Utah case where an implied 
warranty of fitness for the particular purpose was held . to be 
present where wheat sold for the purpose of being fed to 
chickens was found unfit and caused damage to the buyer's 
flock. Thatcher Milling and Elevator Co. v. Campbell, 64 
Utah 422, 231 Pac. 621 ( 1924). 
The case most closely related on its facts to the case at 
bar that has been found is Miller v. Economy Hog & Cattle 
Powder Co., 228 Iowa 626, 293 N.W. 4 (1940). There the 
owner of sheep sued the manufacturer of a livestock powder 
in an action for breach of express warranty and negligence 
for losses of sheep caused through the feeding of defendant's 
powder. The Supreme Court of Iowa held that a statement 
by defendant's agent that it would be all right to feed the 
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powder to plaintiff's sheep in the condition they were in was 
prDper!y submitted to the jury upon the theory of express 
warranty. The Court distinguishes De Zeeuw v. Fox Chemical 
Company, 189 Iowa 1195, 179 N.W. 605 (1920) (the main 
authority relied upon by appellant for Point I and Point III 
of its brief) decided 20 years earlier by the Supreme Court 
of Iowa, as follows: 
"Appellant contends this statement was merely an 
expression of opinion and not a warranty, and relies 
upon De Zeeuw v. Fox Chemical Company, 189 Iowa 
1195, 179 N.W. 605. In that case the statement pleaded 
as a warranty was that a worm powder would improve 
the growth and physical condition of certain hogs, the 
claimed breach being that the powder contained poison. 
The court held the statement was not a warranty but 
merely an expression of opinion similar to that of 
a physican that a certain prescription would benefit 
an ill person. It was also held that the alleged poison 
in the powder was not a breach of the particular war-
ranty pleaded in that case. 
"The evidence of warranty in the case at bar was 
not a promise to improve the growth or effect a cure 
but that it would be all right to feed the stock powder 
to the sheep, in other words that the powder could not 
harm the sheep." 
Later in its opinion, the Court in the Millet' case· again 
refers to "the erroneous premise that- this was a warranty of 
cure." The Court also held that the question of implied 
warranty of fitness was properly left to the jury although the 
powder had a trade name. 
The distinction made by the court between a ''warranty 
of cure" and a normal warranty of good quality and fitness is 
28 
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the basis for a line of decisions which hold that physicians 
and surgeons do not, in the absence of special contract, guar-
antee the success of their treatment (see 27 A.L.R. 1250), 
and that the manufacturer of vaccines or serums for the innocu-
lation of anir11als against some specific disease is not generally 
a warrantor of the efficacy of the remedy. (See 39 A.L.R. 
399). 
The case of De Zeettw v. Fox Chemical Company falls 
into this group of authorities relating to medicines and cures 
which have no application to the case at bar. In the case of 
food, as distinguished from medicines, the trend of the authori-
ties is in the opposite direction, and according to some 
authorities the principle that there is an implied warranty of 
soundness in the sale of provisions has been extended to the 
sale of feed for animals. See 22 Am. Jur. Food, sec. 121, 
p. 904. 
In Economy Hog and Cattle Powder Co. v. Compton, 132 
N.E. 642 ( 1921) an Indiana Court held statements in pam-
phlets and made by defendant's agent that the stock powder 
manufactured by it was "a beneficial and valuable food for 
brood sows" to be "more than mere expressions of opinion or 
dealer's talk. They were representations of fact. 
In Swift and Co. v. Redhead, 147 Iowa 94, 122 N.W. 140, 
( 1909) the agent of a feed company recommended blood 
meal as a cattle feed, stating that it was very fine feed for 
cattle, that many were using it, that it is valuable in preventing 
scours in calves, that it was better than cotton seed meal, and 
it would cause cattle to take on fat much quicker. The Court 
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held that this was sufficient to sustain a verdict finding that 
this was a warranty. 
See also A1oorman Manufacturing Co. v. Wilson, 209 Ill. 
App. 104 (1918) which states in the abstract reported: 
"Evidence was held sufficient to warrant a finding 
that a certain hog remedy sold by plaintiff to defendant 
was sold upon certain representations as to its effects 
upon hogs and that it did not have such effect upon de-
fendant's hogs." 
Judgment was given to defendant in the action which 
was for the price of the product sold. 
See also United States Pipe & Foundry Co. v. City of Waco, 
130 Tex. 126, 108 S.W. (2d) 432 (1937) holding general 
statements of a pipe manufacturer that the pipe was amply 
strong for use under deep fills, that it would stand the load 
and had stood heavy fills at other places to amount to express 
warranties. The Court stated: 
"It is vigorously denied that any warranty was given 
for the reason that the statements relied on to show 
warranty were at most but expressions of an opinion or 
judgment only. 
"To properly appraise this contention, it is necessary 
to here briefly sketch the background of such state-
ments. Hi-tensile pipe was a recent invention and had 
been little used. The parties were not dealing with 
each other at arm's length, and with reference to an 
article as well known to one as the other. The manu-
facturer ltad decidedly superior advantage in its knowl-
edge of the fitness of this pipe for the use intended, 
and of its quality. Presumably, as its largest manu-
facturer and its enthusiastic sponsor, it knew or should 
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have known, better than the city of Waco could know, 
of its fitness and quality." 
The Court then held that the above statements, "considered 
in their proper settings, and not as isolated statements" amount-
ed to an express warranty, quoting from another case that 
"Superior knowledge of the seller, in conjunction 
with the buyer's relative ignorance, operates to make 
the slightest divergence from· mere praise into rep-
resentations of fact effective as a warranty.'' 
And see Tomlinson Co. v. Mo1'gan, ____ N.C. ____ , 82 S.E. 95 3, 
( 1914) where it was held tha~ a representation that fertilizer 
is "a high-grade fertilizer, specially suited for tobacco" justi-
fied the jury to find an express warranty, not a mere opinion; 
Reiger t'. Worth, (1902), 130 -N.C. 268, 41 S.E. 277, holding 
"excellent seed rice" to amount to a warranty; Ingraham v. 
Associated Oil Co., 166 Wash. 205, 6 Pac. ( 2d) 645 ( 193·2) 
where the jury was held justified in finding an express war-
ranty where fruit grower was told that a spray would not harm 
trees but kill a pest; Reese v. Bates, 94 Va. 321, 26 S.E. 865, 
( 1897) to the effect that a sale of guano as "good fertilizer, 
and as well adapted to the raising of potatoes as any other 
in the market" was made with an express warranty; and 
Swift Co. v. Meekins, 179 N.C. 173, 102 S.E. 138 (1920), 
where the court held that a statement by the seller's agent that 
fertilizer "was as good fertilizer as there was on the market, 
as good as any sold to be used for cotton and- corn" consti-
tuted an express warranty as a matter of law, and that the 
question of warranty should not have been left to the jury, 
remanding the case for a new trial. 
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For a long list of cases in which statements were held to 
be warranties, rather than "puffing" or mere opinions, see 
Williston on Sales, Rev. Ed. Vol. 1, Sec. 203, footnote 16, 
first part, preceding the list incorporated by appellant into 
pp. 18-20 of its brief. 
There is no question that Barron told Park that chickens 
on the Mintrate plan had not laid under 65<jo. See the testi-
mony of Barron quoted by appellant on p. 14 of its brief 
(R. 408-409). Barron says he told that to Park, and then he 
goes on to say by way of excuse to the examing counsel--
not to Park-that he made that statement on the basis of 
what he had heard. Of course, as an agent employed to make 
sales, Barron could not be expected to have any personal 
knowledge of experiments with the feed. The only question 
relevant under this Point is whether the statement was actually 
made by him, not from where he obtained his information. 
At the time of the sale to plaintiff, Barron was convinced 
that he was giving true facts to his customers; as soon as 
some doubts as to the correctness of the representations entered 
his mind, he stopped making representations and soon there-
after left the employ of the company (R. 448-449). 
It is true that in addition to the statements as to the past 
experience with Mintrate, some representations were made 
that chickens on the Mintrate plan would produce no less 
than 65<j0 . While the court limited the jury to a finding as 
to past results obtained, it would have been perfectly proper 
to submit also those statements relating to future results to 
be expected. See Williston on Sales, Rev. Ed., Vol. i: 
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"Sec. 212. H7 arr.utty of future et1ents. 
It is said by Blackstone: 'The warranty can only 
reach the things in being at the time of the warranty 
made, and not the things in future; as that a horse 
is sound at the buying of him, not that he will be sound 
two years hence.' An understanding of Blackstone's 
meaning needs a recollection that the law of warranty 
originated in an action on the case for deceit. It is 
of course lttW today that one may bind himself by 
contract for the happening of any future event, and 
a warranty of a piano for a year, for instance is a con-
tract to be answerable for any defect that may occur 
during that time; and the definition of express war-
rmzty in the Sales Act includes promises." (Emphasis 
supplied.) 
See also Sec. 194, p. 499 ibid. to the effect that in its later 
development the action of assumpsit was substituted as a 
remedy for breach of warranty for the earlier action based 
on fraud, and that as a result many cases held that only a 
promise, as distinguished from an affirmation of fact, can 
constitute a warranty. 
B. Park did rely on the oral representations. 
While it is true that plaintiff felt that a written guaranty 
would give him more protection than oral representations alone, 
he placed reliance on both the oral statements and the guaranty. 
He testified on cross examination: 
"Q. Did you ask for the written guaranty? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Why? 
A. Because verbal warranties are not too good. 
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Q. You had no confidence in any verbal warranty? 
A. Well, I had confidence to the effect that anybody, 
if they did you damage, should reimburse you 
for your loss, I should imagine; but without a 
statement of this sort of thing, a man has to have 
a little to show-I figured. 
Q. Didn't you believe Gail Barron? 
A. Yes, I believed Gail Barron, as far as I am a busi-
nessman of any sort, as a friend, yes; but as a 
business agreement, no. 
Q. In other words, you did not rely on his reputation? 
A. Yes, I relied on his reputation on account of his 
pamphlets and books that showed to that effect." 
R. 190). 
Williston on Sales states in sec. 206: 
nThere is danger of giving greater effect to the re-
quirement of reliance than it is entitled to. Doubtless 
the burden of proof is on the buyer to establish this as 
one of the elements of his case. But the warranty 
need not be the sole inducement to the buyer to pur-
chase the goods;'' 
See also 46 Am. Jur. sec. 13, p. 495: 
"One who examines an article himself and relies on 
his own judgment may at the same time protect him-
self by taking a warranty upon which he also relies." 
It is clear, therefore, that one particular warranty need 
not be the sole inducement for a sale. The buyer may rely 
on several different warranties or on his own judgment and 
a warranty. 
The whole question of reliance comes up only in cases 
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where there is a question as to whether the buyer makes the 
purchase on the strength of his own judgment or inspectiq,n, 
or whether he is induced to buy by the seller's representations. 
In the case at bar, there is no question that plaintiff was in 
no position to form a judgment of his own on the appropriate-
ness of defendant's feeding plan for chickens. Nothing short 
of an actual test, that is, a purchase, . could satisfy him as to 
that. Knowing then that he had to rely, that there was no 
other alternative, he did what any cautious and prudent man 
would have done under the circumstances: he asked for as 
many assurances as he could possibly get. First, he listened 
to the oral representations, then he read the pamphlets and 
other literature, and finally he obtained the written agreement. 
As he states in the above testimony, he did have confidence 
in' the verbal warranty, he did have confidence in the salesman · 
and especially the printed material he showed him, and he 
did believe that that would give him some protection in the 
event of any loss, but in addition he felt he should also have 
"a little to show." It is submitted that Barron relied on 
the oral representations as much as on the guaranty. 
In this connection, attention is called to Instruction No. 
12 which instructed the jury fully upon the subject of reliance, 
and to the fact that plaintiff gave his first order for feed before 
the written guaranty was discussed; that at that time he agreed 
to put only 1,250 chickens on the Mintrate feed; that later 
he raised that figure to 2,850 chickens and actually fed them 
Mintrate beginning about June 11 while the guaranty was 
not signed before June 19. (See the Statement of Facts above). 
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C. All the necessarr elements of an express warranty are 
present. 
No statement has been found in Williston on Sales, either 
in section 211 or on page 548 as claimed by appellant (on p. 
26 of its brief) to the effect that when recovery is on a war-
ranty as a statement of fact, the statement must be proved 
to be untrue. Nor does the quotation from Blackstone have 
such a meaning. (See Williston sec. 212 quoted above 
under A). 
Under the Uniform Sales Act the only elements of an ex-
press warranty are ( 1) an affirmation of fact (or promise) ; 
( 2) reliance by the purchaser, and ( 3) a sale. 
Appellant evidently means to say that there should be 
proof of the breach of the warranty. Respondent submits that 
the point of breach of the warranty is covered by Point No. 
IV of appellant's brief relating to proximate cause. If plaintiff 
establishes that his loss was proximately caused by defendant's 
feed, it is submitted that no further proof is required to show 
that the representation is false. See 46 Am. Jur. sec. 736: 
"It is usual to allege that the defendant falsely and 
fraudulently warranted, etc., but the words 'falsely and 
fraudulently' are considered as only matters of form." 
It must be stated, however, that there is clear evidence 
in the record to show that the statement as to 65Cfo production 
was absolutely false. Dr. Elmslie, Director of Research, and 
Mr. Mittelberg, superintendent of- the Experimental Farm 
of defendant, both testified that no experiments to speak of, 
and in any event no experiment resulting in 65Cfo egg pro-
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duction of chickens was conducted on the company farm 
before the release of ~Iintrate 40 to the public -in the fall 
of 1947. Also, none of these company officials knew of any ex-
periment in the field supervised by defendant where any produc-
tion figures "''ere available or showed 657o egg yield (R. 634-
6~·5, 825). The representations made were not only untrue, but 
there is eYidence that defendant knew them to be untrue or, 
without actually knowing their falsity, made them recklessly, 
without regard to their truth or falsity which would have 
made out a case of fraud. 
See Economy Hog and Cattle Powder Co. v. Compton, 
Ind., ____ , 132 N.E. 642 ( 1921) holding a stock powder 
company liable for fraudulent representations that a certain 
powder would keep livestock in a healthy condition. 
That defendant produced two witnesses who testified-
without any clear production figures-that they had had sat-
isfactory results with ~Iintrate over one year after this action 
was started, o£ course, does not prove that there was any testing 
of the product before its release on the market. There was also 
no indication, in the period after the Mintrate was put out, 
in the fall of 1947 and before plaintiff was contacted in June, 
1948, that defendant made any tests or experiments which 
would justify the claims made for the feed and the self-feed 
method. 
POINT NO. II 
THE ISSUE OF THE AUTHORITY OF BARRON TO 
MAKE AN ORAL WARRANTY WAS PROPERLY SUB-
MITTED TO THE JURY. 
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According to Instruction No. 2 plaintiff was not allowed 
to recover under the terms of the written agreement (Exhibit 
(C) because the Court found there was insufficient proof of 
the comparative feed costs as required under paragraph 1 
of ·the agreement (R. 705). The denial of recovery was not · 
predicated upon any ruling with respect to Barron's authority 
to execute the written guaranty. 
While plaintiff is of the opinion that under the evidence 
Barron had authority to execute the written guaranty, that 
question is not here presented. The only question is whether 
Barron had authority to make the oral representations relied 
upon by the plaintiff. 
In this connection, it is submitted that evidence establish-
ing ·Barron's authority to give a written guaranty tends to prove 
that he also had power to make oral representations along 
the same general lines as the guaranty, upon the theory 
that the larger power includes the lesser. The reverse, how-
ever, would not appear to be true. That is to say, if it is found, 
particularly under the theory of implied warranty, that Barron 
lacked authority to enter into a written contract guaranteeing 
definite results, it does not follow therefrom, as appellant con-
tends on p. 39 of its brief, that Bar~on did not have implied 
power to make oral representations within the scope of his 
authority as a sales agent. 
A. There was sufficient evidence to find that Bar1'on had 
express or implied authority to make oral representations. 
1. Express Authority. As has been related in the Statement 
of Facts above, Barron did not execute the guaranty agreement 
38 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
before asking his superior, the District Sales Manager of Utah, 
Mr. J\lcArthur, for authority to execute it. Mr. McArthur 
replied that he would first have to obtain the approval of 
his superior, Mr. McCullough, the State Sales Manager of 
the defendant for Utah, Idaho, and parts of Nevada. Mc-
Arthur called him on the telephone at his home in Idaho and 
was told by McCullough that "by all means you could guaran-
tee it under those circumstances to anyone," and that the 
company "would equal the production of any competitive feed." 
(R. 286, 300). Thereupon McArthur told Barron-and Mr. 
Park-that McCullough had authorized the giving of a 
guaranty to Park. 
McCullough, who was sick in bed when· his depo-
sition was taken, denied that he had given such author-
ity (R. 849). However, since he denied having knowl-
edge of just about every occurrence at sales meetings and 
elsewhere which were testified to by other witnesses, his testi-
mony was evidently not given much weight by the jury. Also, 
there was evidence of rifts within the company, of disagree-
ments between Mittelberg and McCullough with respect to 
the claims that had been made for the self-feed method, a 
definite reversal of McCullough by Mittelberg on the point 
that chickens on their feed would not moult, which occurred 
at the sales meeting of July 19 (R. 419-420, 447-448), and 
finally McCullough was, after the events at Park's place, at 
least temporarily released from his position in the defendant 
company (R. 851-852). This may have been an additional 
reason for his disclaiming any knowledge of the guaranty. 
The telephone company testified for defendant that there had 
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that the larger power includes the lesser. The reverse, how-
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particularly under the theory of implied warranty, that Barron 
lacked authority to enter into a written contract guaranteeing 
definite results, it does not follow therefrom, as appellant con-
tends on p. 39 of its brief, that Barron did not have implied 
power to make oral representations within the scope of his 
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1. Express Authority. As has been related in the Statement 
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before asking his superior, the District Sales Manager of Utah, 
Mr. 1\lcArthur, for authority to execute it. Mr. McArthur 
replied that he would first have to obtain the approval of 
his superior, Mr. McCullough, the State Sales Manager of 
the defendant for Utah, Idaho, and parts of Nevada. Mc-
Arthur called him on the telephone at his home in Idaho and 
was told by McCullough that "by all means you could guaran-
tee it under those circumstances to anyone," and that the 
company "would equal the production of any competitive feed." 
(R. 286, 300). Thereupon McArthur told Barron-and Mr. 
Park-that McCullough had authorized the giving of a 
guaranty to Park. 
.McCullough, who was sick in bed when· his depo-
sition was taken, denied that he had given such author-
ity (R. 849). However, since he denied having knowl-
edge of just about every occurrence at sales meetings and 
elsewhere which were testified to by other witnesses, his testi-
mony was evidently not given much weight by the jury. Also, 
there was evidence of rifts within the company, of disagree-
ments between Mittelberg and McCullough with respect to 
the claims that had been made for the self-feed method, a 
definite reversal of McCullough by Mittelberg on the point 
that chickens on their feed would not moult, which occurred 
at the sales meeting of July 19 (R. 419-420, 447-448), and 
finally McCullough was, after the events at Park's place, at 
least temporarily released from his position in the defendant 
company (R. 851-852). This may have been an additional 
reason for his disclaiming any knowledge of the guaranty. 
The telephone company testified for defendant that there had 
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been no call between McArthur and McCullough at the time 
in question, but stated that its records covered collect calls 
only, and that there had been some telephone conversations 
between McArthur and McCullough later in June, 1948 
(R. 746-747). 
This was sufficient evidence for the jury to find that Mc-
Cullough had expressly authorized Barron through McArthur 
to give the guaranty. 
Appellant insists, however, that any authority to guarantee 
had to come all the way from the head office of the company 
in Quincey, Illinois. This, it is submitted, is not a correct 
view of the law. The evidence is clear that McCullough was 
not a special agent, but a general agent of the company with 
power to recruit salesmen, to hold training programs and in-
struct salesmen as to the quality of the feed and the self-feed 
method, and in general to do anything necessary and proper 
to advance the business of the company in the territory as-
signed to him. He had no special instructions from the com-
pany, as Mr. Holmes testified, "other than would be considered 
in the normal trend of business" (R. 615-616). Particularly 
did he have no special instructions with respect to the giving 
or authorizing of guarantees or warranties. If there was 
actually a policy of the company which did not permit guaran-
tees or warranties, it was never brought to the attention of its 
sales managers or agents. As Mittelberg testified, the sale;, 
instructions were silent in this respect and contained neither 
a permission nor a prohibition (R. 803). At the time in 
question the company was particularly interested in extending 
its sales to the State of Utah. McArthur testified in this respect: 
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"This chicken business-at the itme I was made man-
ager, we had very little business in the chicken feeding, 
and l\1r. Tolley, who preceded me, had tried several 
times to get into the Salt Lake area and the Utah 
County area where -there were a lot of chickens, and 
had not been very s'licq~ssful; and l\1r. McCullough, 
after I was made district ,manager, continually im-
pressed me with the fact that we had to get in and 
get some of this business down here. It was a million-
dollar busines, and it was going by" (R. 291-292). 
It is submitted that l\1cCullough within the scope of his 
powers as general sales manager had authority to authorize 
guaranties which he found helpful in the drive to introduce 
defendant's feed into this area; and that he had good reason 
to assume that obtaining a customer with as large a flock as 
Park's, by means of a written guaranty if need be, would be 
most beneficial for these purposes. 
If the written guaranty was thus found to be expressly 
authorized under the evidence, it is submitted that power to 
make an oral warranty along the same lines can be in-
ferred therefrom, as has been pointed out before. While 
the writing guarantees the production of ··an equal amount 
of eggs" by the l\1intrate birds as is produced by Park's other 
birds, from the practical standpoint of a poultry man the 
657o production figure means just about the same. To him 
a 657o y,ield signifies nothing more than good or adequate 
production, approximately the same level of production that 
he knew from experience that he had achieved before. (The 
evidence discloses that the Larro birds had an 857o egg yield 
for a good part of the period in question) . It was not so 
much the 65fo figure, which only assured him of adequate 
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results, but its combination with the more simple and more 
economical feeding method which finally persuaded Park 
to make the purchase. 
2. Implied authority. (a) The most obvious source of Barron's 
authority to make the oral warranty is found in the instructions 
he received by McCullough and McArthur during the sales-
men's training meetings and from McCullough personally. 
McCullough's authority to give instructions is admitted by 
1\fr. Mittelberg in his testimony (R. 803, 811-812). The 
testimonies of Barron and McArthur are positive to the effect 
that the salesmen were told that the feed had been tried 
numerous times and that there had always been a minimum 
of 657o egg yield when the hens were fed Mintrate in the 
s~lf-feed manner (R. 398-402, 282-285). There was evi-
dence that this statement, together with the other representa-
tions described. in the Statement of Facts above, were intended 
to be repeated to prospective customers. As a matter of fact, 
McArthur accompanied Barron on his first sales trips and 
Barron heard him make the statement as to 657o minimum 
egg lay to a prospective customer (R. 406-407). This was 
sufficient evidence for the jury to find, in accordance with 
Instruction No. 11, together with Instruction No. 15 (I-C), 
that Barron had authority to make the representations he made 
to Park. 
It is submitted that Instruction No. 11, which is criticized 
by appellant on p. 44 of its brief because it uses the term 
"estoppel," correctly states the law which the jury was charged 
to apply, and that it is immaterial whether the particular type 
42 
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of authority referred to was labelled implied authority, ap-
parent authority, or authority by estoppel. 
In his connection, the attention of the Court is invited 
to the following statement pr l\1echem on Agency, 2nd Ed., 
Vol. 1, sec. 723, p. 512: 
"There is, in many places, a tendency to include 
under the one head of 'apparent powers' those de-
duced from usage or from the character in which the 
agent is authorized to act, and also those resulting from 
estoppel. In very many cases it is entirely immaterial 
practically, because there is enough in the proof to 
satisfy the requirements of either rule; and in many 
cases also usage and estoppel may unite to account 
for the powers exercised." 
See also the diagram on p. 515 of the same work where 
apparent authority is listed as being based on the theory of 
estoppel. 
(b) Furthermore, it is submitted that Barron had implied 
power within the scope of his authority as a sales agent, to 
make the oral representations relied upon by Park, particu-
larly in view of the fact that he was introducing a new feed 
and a new feeding method into a new territory and that his 
prospective customers had no means of ascertaining the quality 
and appropriateness of the feed and of the method for them-
selves. 
The Restatement of the Law of Agency, sec. 63, states 
the rule as follows: 
"Unless otherwise agreed, authority to -sell includes 
authority to make such, and only such, representations 
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as the agent reasonably believes to ~e true and as a~e 
usual with reference to such a subJect matter or, m 
the absence of usctge, representations concerning quali-
ties of the subject matter which, at the time, are not 
open to inspection and as to which the principal has 
reason to know the buyer will desire to be informed." 
(Emphasis supplied.) 
And J\.1echem on Agency, cited above, states in sec. 881, 
p. 631 that there may be cases 
''in which the making of a warranty of quality is so 
practically essential to the making of the sale as, with-
out proof of usage, to justify the inference of the power 
as a necessary incident of the authority to sell. A num-
ber of cases have been put upon this ground. Thus, 
an agent for a distant principal, endeavoring to in-
troduce a new article in a certain community, and who 
could not sell it unless it was warranted, has been held 
to have authority to warrant as a necessary incident 
to the authority to sell." (Emphasis supplied). 
See also sec. 890, p. 636 of the same work: 
"Thus, if the principal should send an agent out to 
introduce and sell a new article, as, for example, a new 
machine, a new article of food, a new medicine, and 
the like, authority to answer questions or to make 
statements, concerning such matters as would naturally 
and ordinarily arise under such circumstances, would 
properly be implied. Questions respecting the purpose 
of the article, the manner in which it might be safely 
handled, the conditions and circumstances under which 
it could be properly used, and the like, would fall within 
this prinCiple." 
In International Harvester Co. v. Lawyer, ____ Okla. ____ , 
155 Pac. 617 (1916) it was held that an agent with power to 
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sell an automobile in a new territory had implied authority 
to warrant that it would go over the particular roads and 
could go anywhere a team of mules could be driven (which 
was held an express warranty rather than a statement of 
opinion). The Court stated: 
"In the case at bar, the defendant was seeking to 
introduce an automobile, untried and unproven in that 
particular section, and it seems most reasonable to 
presume that an agent, endeavoring to obtain some 
one ~ho would stand sponsor for it there, owing to 
a general custom, had the implied power to warrant 
the same. If the reputation of the automobile in that 
vicinity had been so well established that it had be-
come a staple, then this rule might not apply, but 
we believe it does apply most certainly when an untried 
article is sought to be introduced in a new field." 
See also Darks v. Scudders-Gale Grocer Co., 146 Mo. App, 
246, 130 S.W. 430 (1910) where the court held the defendant 
· company bound by the representations made by its agent in 
connection with the sale of a ginger extract, stating: 
"The defendant permitted the agent to go into the 
field and solicit orders. In soliciting business for the 
defendant, questions would naturally come up con-
cerning the quality and usefulness of the articles the 
agent was attempting to sell, and therefore statements 
made by the agent concerning the quality of the articles 
and the purposes for which they were intended must 
be within his apparent authority." 
Cf. Smith Table Co. v. Madsen, 84 Pac. 885, 30 Utah 297 
( 1906) to the effect that a certain traveling salesman had 
power, within the apparent scope of his authority, to give a 
trade discount, and Smith v. Droubay, 20 Utah 44~· ( 1899) 
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holding that a sales agent with power to make a contract also 
had power, as an incident to his employment, to fix the time 
for the delivery of the goods. 
The case at. bar falls directly under the principles of the 
above authorities. Neither Barron nor any other salesman 
could have sold a single bag of Mintrate in this state, had it 
not been for the representations made as to 65lfo egg yield 
together with the promise of a more simple and more econom-
ical feeding method. Thus, whether McCullough or anyone else 
in the company expressly or by implication authorized Barron to 
make an oral warranty, his power to warrant must be implied 
as a necessary incident to his authority to sell under the peculiar 
circumstances of the case. Under the above authorities no 
particular proof of custom to warrant is required under such 
circumstances. 
The authorities relied upon by appellant on pages 28-38 
of its brief are not inconsistent with this position. They 
are based on the principle that a salesman has no implied 
power to do anything that is unusual or extraordinary. As com-
pared with the facts of these cases, there is nothing unusual 
in giving an oral warranty in the case at bar. There is no 
question, as these authorities hold, that a salesman has no 
implied power to take back merchandise, to modify the terms 
of a contract after it is complete, ~o sell for a lower price 
than instructed, or to warrant liquor against seizure under 
the revenue laws. All these powers are truly "unusual" 
or extraordinary. However, as is stated in Friedman & Sons 
v. Kelly, 126 Mo. App. 2]9, 102 S. W. 1066, quoted at 
length by appellant on p. 34 of its brief, while a traveling 
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salesman does not have authority to warrant whiskey against 
seizure under the revenue laws, he does have implied power 
to make warranties which are not unusual such as a warranty 
of the quality and condition ot the whiskey sold. 
, The case of Roy .. tl Seed ami L1lilling Co. l'. Thorne, 142 
lvliss. 92 ( 1926), cited by appellant on p. 38 of its brief, does 
not relate to the implied authority of an agent, however. It 
holds that there was no implied warranty of fitness, and that 
the plaintiff who \Yas the customer of the dealer could not 
recover against the manufacturer on the ground of breach of 
warranty. 
It is conceivable, as appellant contends, that the mak-
ing of a u•1·itten gttarantee binding a feed company to reim-
burse a customer in a certain amount would be held unusual, 
and not within the implied powers of a sales agent. But that 
is not true for oral representations without the help of which 
a sale in a new territory could not be expected by the company 
to be consummated. Also, defendant does not poip.t. to any 
significant evidence to the effect that oral warranties by feed 
companies are unusual. The plaintiff said he thought it was 
unusual for a feed company to give a written guarantee (R. 
191), that he personally had not received an oral guarantee 
(R. 191); Mr. Wood of General Mills stated that he had not 
seen a written guarantee of the type Barron received before 
(R. 385); and Mr. Holmes, a director of the defendant com-
pany said that his company had not given express authority 
to make written or oral guarantees· and had a policy against 
permitting them. Mr. Mittelberg testified, however, that 
nothing was said to the agents and employees of the company 
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about guarantees, that there was just no general permission 
given to execute guarantees (R. 803). See Mechem, sec. 
887, p. 635 where the author states that 
"evidence is not admissible to prove that it was not 
the custom of this particular principal to warrant, un-
less it be shown that the purchaser had notice of that 
fact, or that the agent was expressly forbidden to 
warrant, unless notice of such prohibition be brouaht 
1 h " b home to t 1e pure aser. . 
For cases in which feed companies, including the defend-
ant company itself, have been found to have made a warranty, 
through the medium of an agent, see for example l\1iller v. 
Economy Hog and Cattle Powder Co,, 228 Iowa 626, 293 
N. \VI. 4 ( 1940) holding that a warranty by an agent that 
the stock powder in question was harmless for sheep was 
not an unusual warranty; Economy Hog and Cattle Powder 
Co. v. Compton, ____ Ind. ____ , 132 N.E. 642 ( 1921); Crouch 
v. National Liz)estock Remedy Co., 205 Iowa 51, 217 N. W. 
55 7 ( 19i8) where the authority of the agent to make a war-
ranty was not questioned; and Swift & Co. v. Redhead, 147 
Iowa 94, 122 N. W. 140 (1909) where the authority of an 
agent to warrant the quality of feed for cattle was also assumed 
to be present. 
And in A1oorman Manufacturing Co. v. Harris, 280 
Ky. 845, 134 S. W. (2nd) 936 (1939), the court held in an 
action for damages resulting from the feeding of defendant's 
mineral to dairy cows that defendant's agents acted within 
the scope of their authority in selling the feed when making 
representations with respect to the product. (The language 
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of the court is not quite clear on this point, but this is evidently 
what it meant to say) . 
B. There 'Was e11idence that Barron had authority ttnder the 
theory of ratification. 
Under the rules as stated in the Restatement of the Law 
of Agency, sec. 82, et seq., ratification is basically an "affirm-
ance" of a previous unauthorized act by the principal or his 
authorized agent. Affirmance may be inferred from any 
conduct manifesting consent, from failure to repudiate trans-
actions, or from the receipt or retention of benefits. It is not 
necesary that there be a receipt of benefits or their retention, 
if affirmance can be inferred from words or conduct of the 
principal or his authorized agent. 
In the case at bar there is one incident that may be found 
to establish Barron's authority by operation of the doctrine 
of ratification. 
On July 19, 1948, after plaintiff had been using defend-
ant's feed for about a month, and had started to notice a loss 
of weight among the Mintrate birds, Mr. Mittelberg came out 
to see him. Mr. Barron testified as follows: 
"He was worried about the loss of weight, and he 
wanted someone to look at them. He wanted 
some man, in our company if possible, to see them. 
"Q. Did you get some man in your company to look 
at them? 
A. On the 19th of July Mr. Mittelberg of our com-
pany went to Park's place and looked at them. 
Q. Were you with him? 
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A. Yes. 
THE WITNESSS: May I qualify one answer? 
Q. Yes. 
A. That there was a meeting held at the Hotel Utah, 
as I remember it, it was on July 19. It was that 
day that Mr. Mittelberg went to Park's place. 
Q. Did you tell Mr. Mittelberg about the loss of 
weight of Park's birds? 
A. Yes. 
Q. What did :Mr. Mittelberg say about the birds? 
A. He asked Park if he had tried different methods, if 
he had mixed his wheat with his oats. As I re-
member it, he said specifically, in some instances, 
that where it is, they eat more, and he asked about 
such general questions of Mr. Park" (R. 418-419). 
On the same day the meeting of salesmen and Mr. Mittel-
berg and Mr. McCullough took place which has already been 
referred to, Mr. Mittleberg discussed the self-feed method in 
· great detail and reversed McCullough on the point that chickens 
on their method would not moult, also cautioned the salesmen 
about the self-feed method in general and discouraged them 
from "selling a method" (R. 419-420). 
It must be assumed that Mr. Mittleberg knew when he 
went to see Mr. Park on the same day what representations the 
salesmen had been instructed to make, and that Barron pre-
sumably had made those representations to Park when he 
first sold him the feed. If he did not know about the guaranty, 
he knew or must have known about the oral representations. 
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Knowing these he went out and advised Park on how to im-
prove the weight of his chickens. That showed, if not more, 
at least silent acquiescence, and consequently ratification of 
the oral warranties made. Later, when Mr. Mittelberg went 
to see Mr. Park about the guaranty, in the end of August, he 
did not disclaim all liability, only stated, according to Mittel-
berg's own testimony, that no setttlement would be made 
"on the basis of that contract" (R. 800). He did not say, as 
appellant intimates on p. 42 of its brief that Barron had no 
authority to make oral representations. 
Iri connection with the theory of ratification, attention is 
called to Mechem on Agency, above cited, sec. 396, p. 289: 
"It is not to be denied that there may occasionally 
be found cases in which it seems to be asserted that 
there may be ratification without knowledge. Most 
of these cases when examined seem to be sound enough 
upon their facts, ... and what is said as to ratification 
in many of them is probably merely an inadvertent 
expression. Part of them belong to a class of cases . . . 
which do not depend upon ratification at all. These 
are cases in which an agent while doing an authorized 
act has done some incidental act, given some promise, 
or made some representation which was not expressly 
authorized, but which is binding upon the principal 
under the ordinary rules of agency . . . Although 
ratification need not be resorted to at all in. these 
cases, . . . it is said that the principal is liable~ if he 
takes the benefits of the performance, even although 
he did not know of these incidental acts. The con-
clusion would ordinarily have been the same, if the 
doctrine of ratification had not been referred to." 
Instruction No. 10 does not use the term "ratification'' at 
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all. While there is the above evidence of ratification in the 
record, the instruction may very well be read, in the light 
of the above quotation from Mechem, as a charge with re-
spect to implied or apparent authority rather than ratification. 
In this connection compare the language used in Smith v. 
Droubay, 20 Utah 443 (1899) where the opinion at pages 
450 and 451, speaks in terms of "acceptance of benefits by 
the principal" when holding that the agent had implied or 
apparent authority as an incident of his employment. 
C. There was sufficient evidence to submit the case to 
the jury on the theory of estoppel. 
As has been pointed out above under the discussion of 
implied authority, Instruction No. 11 was properly submitted 
to the jury permitting it to find that Barron's authority to 
make oral representations may be derived from the instructions 
he received at sales staff meetings. While the use of the 
term "estoppel" may have been a misnomer, it is submitted 
that the use of technical expressions like "estoppel" is not 
conclusive as long as the main principles of the law of agency 
are correctly stated to the jury. That there is a certain amount 
of confusion surrounding the concept of estoppel, and that 
the borderlines between ratification, estoppel, and apparent 
authority are somewhat cloudy, is evidenced by the above 
quotations from Mechem on Agency, to which the following 
excerpt may be added: 
Sec. 456, p. ~;36: 
"In a large number of cases, if not in a majority 
of them, there are present some elements of estoppel, 
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as well as circumstances from which pure inferences 
of approval in fact may be drawn; and any conclusion 
will be likely to be one in which both elements are 
more or less inseparably mixed. Courts and writers-
sometimes carelessly, sometimes unavoidably-pass in 
apparent unconsciousness from one field to the other. 
It is perhaps true, also, that our whole process of draw-
ing inferences of fact springs from the same roots 
as that from which estoppel springs. At any rate, 
it is entirely clear that, in the various rules and state-
ments of principle made respecting this matter of rati-
fication by acquiescence, the element of estoppel is 
constantly found and that it plays a large part in the 
actual determination of the case." 
This discussion shows that the concept of estoppel is a 
very wide one, and as has been stated before, Professor Mechem 
bases the whole theory of "apparent authority" on the idea 
of "holding out" or "estoppel." But regardless of whether 
estoppel is used in a wide or a narrow sense, appellant's 
theory that estoppel applies only to the one situation where 
someone has been held out as an agent and is then discharged 
without notice to persons dealing with him, is based on an 
entirely too restrictive use of the term. 
It is submitted that there is one situation that arose under 
the facts in the case at bar which gave rise to the operation 
of the true theory of estoppel: 
Assuming that McCullough did not approve the written 
guarantee, the facts are undisputed that lvicArthur came to 
plaintiff's place and assured him that the Sales Manager 
had authorized it. Mr. Park did not rely on Barron's authority 
in the first place. He made inquiries of Barron, and of Me-
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Arthur, who was the only superior officer of the company 
with whom he had any contact. McArthur told Park per-
sonally and definitely that the company had approved the 
guaranty. What more should Park have done? Telephone 
McCullough himself, or someone in the office in Illinois? 
It is true that a party dealing with an agent is bound to 
ascertain, where any reasonable man would have any doubt, 
what is the true scope of the authority of the agent. It is 
submitted that that is exactly what plaintiff did. He did 
not have to go to the principal himself to ascertain the scope 
of Barron's authority. He only had to do as much as is 
reasonably necessary under the circumstances. It is sub-
mitted that under the circumstances Park was justified in taking 
McArthur's word for it, that the defendant through its Dis-
trict Sales Manager McArthur held Barron out as its agent 
authorized to write the guaranty; that Park in reliance thereon 
changed his position to his detriment by feeding the Mintrate 
to his chickens; and that the company is therefore estopped 
to deny Barron's authority. 
In connection with this discussion of Barron's authority 
to warrant, it might be pointed out generally ( 1) that McArthur 
himself repeated the oral representations to Park, and that 
as the District Sales Manager the scope of his authority is 
even wider than that of Barron; (2) that as far as the implied 
warranty of fitness for a particular purpose is concerned, 
Barron's authority to warrant need not be proved. See Mechem, 
cited above, sec. 883. See also Thatcher Milling and Elevator 
Co. v. Campbell, 64 Utah 422, 231 Pac. 621 (1924) holding 
the seller of chicken feed liable on the theory of an implied 
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\\'aranty of fitness .for the particular purpose; and ( 3) that 
as far as the representations of defendant are contained in 
advertising matter such as Exhibit A herein, they may be ac-
tionable regardless of the authority of an agent. 
POINT NO. III 
BREACH OF EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTY 
MAY BE PREDICATED UPON MISDIRECTIONS GIVEN 
BY DEFENDANT CONCERNING THE USE OF ITS FEED. 
The case at bar does not relate to the dissemination of 
ideas or professional advice to cure a sickness nor the recom-
mendation of a method standing alone, as appellant contends, 
but simply the sale of a feed with definite instructions by the 
seller concerning its use. In a case of this kind, it is submitted 
that there is not a separate sale of the feed, and another 
separate transaction with respect to the method, but both the 
feed and the method are united into an integrated whole so 
that the instructions for its use become part of the sale of the 
product itself. Defendant has expressed this idea itself in 
its advertising leaflet (Exhibit A) entitled the "NEW, EASY, 
NO MIX, SELF-FEED CONCENTRATE." 
It is submitted that the instructions for use of a product 
given by a manufacturer are nothing but representations of fact 
(or promises) relating to the use that can be made of the 
product and the results that can be obtained, which amount 
to express warranties if they induce the sale and the buyer 
relies on them. 
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If, for example, a housewife buys "No-Rub Floor Wax," 
she relies on the representation that the wax can be used with-
out the additional work of polishing, just as much as that 
he wax itself is of good quality. And if it turns out to 
be not "self-polishing" as expected, the manufacturer would 
have no defense to an action for breach of warranty to the 
effect that the wax itself was perfect, and that good results 
could have been obtained by the use of an electric polisher. 
It is submitted that simplicity of operation, where held 
out as an inducement to a sale, is an affirmation of fact or 
promise relating to the goods themselves which may give 
rise to an action for breach of warranty, irrespective of the 
quality of the goods themselves. 
Another example may come even closer to the facts of 
the present case: Another housewife buys an "Instant Dessert 
-No Cooking." On the back of the box there are two sets 
of directions. Method 1 describes the "no-cooking" way 
of preparing the dessert. 1\1ethod 2 instructs the housewife 
that she may cook it if she prefers, but the process takes longer 
and is more cumbersome. She tries Method 1 and her family 
gets sick. Should the manufacturer be allowed to say that 
the ingredients of the dessert itself are good, that Method 1 
might be harmful, but that he cannot be held responsible 
for a mere method, particularly where an alternative method 
was also provided for? 
The same reasoning applies to an implied warranty 
of fitness for the particular purpose. It is submitted that 
fitness includes all appropriateness of using a product, 
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and if the seller suggests a method that is harmful, that would 
amount to a breach of the implied warranty. 
No authorities have been found expressly discussing 
this point. However, the courts seem to assume that the 
suggestion of a method of use may give rise to an action for 
breach of warranty. 
In i1Iiller Z'. Economy Hog and Cattle Powder Co., 228 
Iowa 626, 293 N. W. 4 (1940), for example, the court stated: 
"Veterinarians also testified the forced feeding 
method of giving the powder to sheep with a mild form 
of gastritis would have a bad effect and be dangerous 
because some of the animals would get too much of 
the mixture. This method was adopted by appellee 
under instructions from Kenworthy." 
The Court concluded that there was substantial evidence to 
show that the death of the sheep was chargeable to the 
feeding of the stock powder. 
And in Aloorman Manufacturing Company v. Barker, ___ _Ind. 
____ , 40 N.E. ( 2d) 348 ( 1942), an action was brought for dam-
ages resulting from the loss of a litter of pigs caused by feeding 
defendant's feed. The suit was on the theory of breach of 
warranty and negligence. Plaintiff's evidence disclosed that 
he was instructed by defendant's agent to let the sows have 
all the feed they wanted, and that they would not eat too 
much of it. The Court said that there was no evidence that 
the feed contained any deleterious or poisonous ingredients; 
and that in the Court's judgment, the complaint is 
"based upon the theory that the appellants recommend-
ed that the sows be alowed to eat all they wanted of the 
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mineral· and although the appellee used due care and 
precaution, the loss occur~ed ~s th~ prox~mate result 
of the negligent verbal duect10ns m tellmg appellee 
how to feed the product." 
Judgment for plaintiff was reversed for failure of the instruc-
tions to include the element of plaintiff's freedom from con-
tributory negligence. 
In this connection attention is called to Instruction 
No. 3 to the effect that plaintiff has to establish that 
he followed the instructions given to him by defendant. 
Assuming that appellant's theory is correct, plaintiff would 
be required to show (as he has done) that he complied with 
defendant's directions as a prerequisite to recovery, but 
defendant would then .be allowed to defend on the theory 
that the loss would not have occurred if the instructions had 
been disregarded. This, it is submitted, cannot be the law 
of this state. 
POINT NO. IV 
THERE WAS AMPLE EVIDENCE THAT PLAINTIFF'S 
LOSS WAS PROXIMATELY CAUSED BY DEFENDANT'S 
FEED AND FEEDING METHOD. 
There was a great mass of highly persuasive evidence link-
ing the Mintrate feed and self-feed plan with the deaths 
among plaintiff's chickens and the decline in their egg 
production. It is hard to see how under these circumstances 
appellant can earnestly contend that proximate causation was 
not s'ufficiently established. 
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Not only was there a great volume of testimony pointing 
to the feed used as the cause of plaintiffs losses, but this 
evidence is practically uncontroverted by any proof defendant 
had to offer. 
Appellant insists at least six different times in the course 
of its brief that "no veterinarian had ever examined the chick-
ens" (p. 83, also pages 4, 6, 50, 54, 82). It fails to mention 
one of its own major witnesses, Robert Allan Sturdy, Doctor 
of Veterinary Medicine and Research Veterinarian of the 
Moorman Manufacturing Company (R. 707). As has been 
related in the Statement of Facts above, Dr. Sturdy was called 
to Utah by defendant's agents in order to make a thorough 
examination of plaintiffs chickens. He did so, and was quite 
disturbed about what he found, remarking to the bystanders 
that '\-\'e are just starving these chickens to death on all the 
feed they want" (R. 290, 424, 524, 15 5). On the witness 
stand as defendant's witness, Dr. Sturdy recalled having made 
a statement somewhat to t~at effect (R. 732, 719), and ad-
mitted that the 1vfintrate . birds did not look good, but looked 
"rough," (R. 727), as compared with the Larro birds, that 
there were many culls and the birds were thin and that the 
consumption of too many oats to which the chickens had free 
access at all times in the self-feed program may well have 
been the cause of plaintiff's troubles (R. 732-735). 
There was none of the conflicting expert testimony that 
is ordinarily offered in cases of this type. See for example 
Moorman Mfg. Co. v. Harris, 280 Ky. 845, 134 S.W. (2d) 
936 (1939) concerning a feed for dairy cows; and Crouch v. 
National Livestock Remedy Co. et al., 205 Iowa 51, 217 N.W. 
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55 7 ( 1928) where the testimony of the veterinarians was con-
flicting, but the court held that evidence that the hog remedy 
in question had resulted in the death of hogs was sufficient to 
carry the case to the jury on the question of proximate cause. 
Plaintiff's additional items of proof tending to show 
proximate causation may be briefly summarized as follows: 
1. The fact that plaintiff used Mintrate only for one 
seperately kept portion of his chickens, and , that none of the 
symptoms complained of developed in the non-11intrate 
chickens; see Crouch v. National Livestock Remedy Co., supra, 
where the plaintiff kept one bunch of hogs in a separate pen 
and did not feed the remedy to them by the same method of 
forced feeding, and these hogs did not get sick. 
2. The testimony of two experts in the feed and poultry 
business, Mr. \Vood and Mr. Bryson, that the l\fintrate birds 
were getting thin and that their eggs were not up to standard 
(R. 244-245, 247, 356-357, 359). 
3 .. The testimony of all the officers and agents of defend-
ant company who observed plaintiff's two sets of chickens, in-
cluding the testimony of the superintendent of defendant's ex-
perimental farm, Mr. Mittelberg, to the effect that the birds on 
the Mintrate feed were thin and in poor C(")ndition, that their 
egg production fell off and many died as a result of cannibal-
ism which broke out about one month after plaintiff put 
them on defendant's feed and about one week after he first 
noticed their loss of weight; permitting the inference that 
they were all convinced that the Mintrate on the self-feed plan 
was the cause of the cannibalism, the deaths and the loss of 
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r 
egg production (R. 807-809, 287-288, 417-424). See for 
example 11ittelberg's letter to Gail Barron of September 1, 
1948 in which he stated with reference to plaintiff's Mintrate 
birds: 
rtlrrithout eating the tn·oper amount of scratch their 
pbyJic,;/ co.:zd.:tion fell off and cannibalism developed. 
You have heard the saying: 'You can lead a horse to 
\Yater but you can't make him drink.' Here it seems 
we might change that saying: 'You can feed scratch 
but you can't make them eat it!" ( R. 809) , 
blaming the feeding method for the cannibalism and the 
~ r general deterioration of the chickens, on a slightly different 
theory from that of Dr. Sturdy, who expressed the opinion 
that the overdose of oats was the cause of plaintiff's losses. 
4. The fact that a few days after August 28, when Mr. 
Mittelberg visited plaintiff's farm, he changed the general 
instructions with respect to the self-feed method, limiting and 
discouraging its use (R. 804, 434-436). See also his letter of 
September 1 in which he further stated: 
and 
"Whenever poultrymen are .using the laying mash 
and scratch system of feeding it seems advisable to 
recommend the use of our Mintrate mix in a laying 
mash instead of self-feeding it," 
"Some who are now using the self-feed plan may get 
better production if they would revert to the scratch 
and mash system" (R. 809). _ 
5. Defendant's own evidence showing that any testing of 
the new Mintrate product that the company may have under-
taken was wholly inadequate and insufficient and in no way 
61 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
justified the claims that were made for the product on the self-
feed method (R. 626-635, 825). 
6. Expert testimony that the self-feed method should not 
be recommended, and that in any event it should be approached 
with caution (R. 767, 762, 362, 382), all of which tends to 
prove that the method has not as yet passed its experi-
mental stage and should not have been unconditionally re-
leased to the public. 
7. Dr. Draper's testimony that cannibalism in a situation 
like the present must be caused by faulty nutrition (R. 774). 
8. The opinion of defendant's expert witnesses Dr. Draper 
and Dr. Elmslie that the composition and ingredients of a 
feed might be harmless without assuring that the feed is good 
from the standpoint of improving the growth and production 
of chickens (R. 766, 644-645). 
9. Expert testimony that the feeding of unlimited amounts 
of oats is harmful to chickens, and that laying hens require 
varying rations of feed depending upon the percentage of 
their egg production, both of which are recognized principles of 
nutrition which were not followed in defendant's self-feed pro-
gram (R. 7~4-735, 757, 648, 768-770, 816-817). 
10. The testimony of three other poultry farmers who fed 
Mintrate on the self-feed plan to some of their chickens of 
similar ages for similar lengths of time with similar unsuccessful 
experiences, including low egg production, severe picking and 
cannibalism (R. 462, 559, 587). 
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This evidence which is discussed in greater detail in the 
Statement of Facts above, it is submitted, is amply sufficient 
to sustain the verdict of the jury with respect to proximate 
cal!sation in the case at bar. 
Authorities very much in point are i1liller Z1• Economy Hog 
& (;.,;tie Fuznier Co., 228 Iowa 626, 293 N.W. 4 (1940) hold-
ing that the testimony of veterinarians was sufficient to sustain 
a verdict that the death of sheep was proximately caused by 
defendant's stock powder; and Crouch v. National Livestock 
Remedy Co., et al. supra, holding that in an action against 
H. C. Moorman doing business under the name of "National 
Live Stock Remedy Company (not Inc.) " to recover damages 
for the death of hogs the question of proximate cause was 
properly left to the jury. See also Swift & Co. v. Redhead, 
147 Iowa 94, 122 N.W. 140 which held that the evidence 
sustained a finding that a certain cattle feed was not suitable 
for fattening cattle, as represented, but was injurious· to the 
cattle so fed. 
Appellant's main argument appears to be that there are 
numerous causes of sickness and deaths in the poultry business, 
that death or loss of production in chickens may occur "with-
out apparent reason," and that consequently plaintiff's losses 
must have resulted from something not connected with the 
feed. For support of its contention appellant relies heavily 
on testimony purportedly given by Mr. Conta at R. 341; Mr. 
Conta, however, did not make any such statement at that page 
of the Record nor at any other page that respondent has been 
able to find. Appellant also refers to some testimony by 
plaintiff, which 1s, however, merely to the effect that there 
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are diseases among chickens and that plaintiff has had experi-
ence with some of them (R. 192-193). 
Respondent does not deny that chickens, like all living 
creatures, are susceptible to disease and other hazards not 
necessarily, though often, related to their feeding. In-
struction :No. 5 covers this point fully, giving ample con-
sideration to defendant's position. But it does not go as 
far as to state what appellant apparently had in mind, that 
chickens ~'just die'' or go off production without any determin-
able cause. To attempt to escape liability in this fashion by 
a plain denial of the principle of causation is a new type of 
defense not known to the law as yet. If this is not the mean-
ing of appellant's contention, then its argument appears to be 
reduced to the claim that disease or some similar factor 
must have caused plaintiff's losses, without attempting to put 
its finger on any particular disease or cause which would ex-
clude the nutritional factor as the only proximate cause of 
plaintiff's damage. 
Not only is there no evidence that there was any other 
cause that might have resulted in plaintiff's loss, but 
there is positive proof to the effect that plaintiff's chick-
ens were not diseased, neither on June 1, 1948, when the 
2,850 pullets were moved over to the east side of the road 
(Conta R. 307-310), nor in the end of August, 1948 when 
Dr. Sturdy saw them and made some post mortem examina-
tions. There is not the slightest evidence that plaintiff's 
chickens had any sicknesses after they entere~ the laying 
stage, except for a possible few cases of "b~g liver," and the 
.Newcastle disease, which did, however, not hit the birds before 
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November, close to the December cut-off date after which 
plaintiff was not permitted to prove any loss. As has been 
pointed out in the Statement of Facts, Dr. Sturdy did not 
positively diagnose any case of big liver in plaintiff's flock, 
and further stated that this disease does not spread readily 
and is usually limited to a few birds in a flock (R. 743, 729-
730. As far as Newcastle is concerned, it has been ex-
plained in the Statement of Facts that any losses caused by this 
disease are automatically excluded from plaintiff's claim for 
damages because plaintiff asked to recover only those losses in 
excess of losses in the Larro birds, and the Larro birds were 
afflicted with Newcastle almost to the same extent as the other 
chickens. 
Appellant also mentions chicken-pox, tracheitis, and pul-
lorum. As has been shown in the Statement of Facts, plaintiff's 
chickens had chicken-pox and tracheitis in April, 1948 when 
they were 2¥2 months old, and at that time a number of them 
died therefrom (R. 193, 199). There was evidence to the 
effect that they had no more trace of these diseases when 
they entered upon egg production and that generally 
these diseases do not recur in the same flock, particularly where 
chickens have been vaccinated as was here the case. Dr. 
Sturdy did not find any case of these diseases. There was 
also evidence that none of the chickens had pullorum, a disease 
which today is largely controlled at the hatcheries and the 
baby chicks are tested before they enter the State of Utah 
(R. 193). 
As far as the "picking" is concerned, in the severe form 
of cannibalism, the evidence discloses that it is not a disease, but 
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a vice or habit (R. 726, 758), and that in the case at bar it 
was not an independent cause, but rather a link in the chain 
of causation. In other words, severe picking and cannibalism 
was caused by the Mintrate feed and feeding method which 
made the birds thin and restless, and the cannibalism in turn 
led to the death and loss of production of many of the Min-
trate chickens. This is clearly established by the evidence 
of Dr. Draper (R. 774) and of Mr. Mittelberg (R. 809). 
It is submitted that under the evidence none of the dis-
eases or other hazards have in any way been proved to have 
been a possible cause of plaintiff's losses. The correctness 
of the principle is not disputed that where the evidence points 
with equal force to two causes, only one of which makes the 
defendant liable, the plaintiff must fail. But respondent 
is at a .loss to find any evidence pointing to any second cause 
of loss in the case at bar in addition to defendant's feed and 
feeding method. 
Appellant further insists that the testimony of the three 
·poultry men with similar unsuccessful experiences was not 
sufficient to prove proximate causation. Appeltant relies on 
Crouch v. National Livestock Co., .rupra, where the court held, 
however, that there was substantial evidence to find proximate 
causation. The testimony of others whose hogs had also died 
after eating the same hog remedy was held inadmissible but 
not primarily on the ground of remoteness stated by appellant, 
but for the main reason that the hog powder used by them 
was different in color; coarseness, and chemical analysis. 
In Economy Hog & Cattle Co. v. Compton, ____ Ind. ____ , 
132 N.E. 642 (1921), and 135 N.E. 1 (1922), evidence of 
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sickness of other hogs caused by the same powder was held to be 
admissible and the Supreme Court of Indiana stated: 
"We. do not understand that appellants are con-
tending that it is not competent to show like effects of 
the powder on other hogs under like conditions. \Ve 
find no objection when the other owners testified. We 
also find that the testimony in defense is largely made 
up by farmers who had used this powder and thought 
it all that appellants claimed for it. It would hardly 
be safe to- confine the case to the scientific proposition 
of the chemical analysis and mechanical mixture of 
the powder, and the effect which the combination 
would have upon hogs. This must be especially true 
where the symptoms are all objective. Hogs do not 
speak our language." 
The testimony of other similar users of the Mintrate feed was 
introduced as supplementary evidence only, to be. con-
sidered in addition to the great amount of other more direct 
proof. The jury must have clearly understood the nature of 
this evidence under the cautioning Instruction No. 4. 
Appellant's rebuttal testimony, however, cannot have 
carried much weight. In the first place, both witnesses, 
one of whom was an employee of the defendant company 
(R. 776) started to use Mintrate only in June and July, -1949, 
about one year after Park bought it, and after the proceedings 
in this case had long been com_menced. Secondly, appellant 
admits that the company requested Barker to make a test 
which may have led the jury to believe that the experi-
ment was staged for purposes of use as evidence in the ex-
pected trial. And finally, Mr. Barker, who had a flock of 6,500 
chickens, did not risk more than 500 on the Mintrate 
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plan, and although he claimed that the Mintrate pro-
gram was very successful and saved him a great deal of 
grinding and mixing which he used to do by himself, 
he intimated that he was not ready to put his other 6,000 
chickens also on the new feeding plan. 
In connection with appellant's reference to Wigmore 
on Evidence on p. 56 and 57 of its brief, respondent merely 
wishes to state that in the case at bar plaintiff did not have 
the burden of proving "general or usual tendency" or "cer-
tainty or inevitableness" of results, but merely the fact that 
his own chickens died or became incapacitated as a proximate 
result of defendant's feed. 
Plaintiff does not claim that there are any harmful 
ingredients in the feed, nor that it has any composi-
tion other than that stated on its bag. But plaintiff does 
contend that the mere fact of its chemical purity and correct 
composition does not prove that the feed as such is good or 
beneficial for laying hens, nor that the particular feeding 
method adopted by defendant is good or beneficial for chickens. 
POINT NO. V 
EXHIBIT C WAS PROPERLY ADMITTED. 
The Court instructed the jury that Exhibit C may be 
considered only for the purpose of determining whether oral 
representations had been made; and that no recovery could be 
had under the writing itself· because proof of comparative 
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feed costs had not been made as required under its terms. 
(Instruction No. 2). 
This Exhibit guarantees to plaintiff the production of "an 
equal amount of eggs" by the Mintrate birds as is produced 
by the Larro birds. As has been pointed out before under 
Point No. II, a representation that 65ro egg production had 
always been achieved means nothing more than that good 
or satisfactory results have been obtained. It relates to the 
same general subject matter as the "equal production clause" 
of Exhibit C. It is submitted that the fact that this document 
was written and signed by defendant's agent Gail Barron, 
whether he had authority to make a _guaranty or not, is evidence 
of the fact t._l].at he made oral representations relating to egg 
production on the 1fintrate plan, and that Exhibit C was prop-
erly admitted in evidence for the limited purpose stated in 
tL~e instruction. 
The admission of the Exhibit did not in any way harm 
defendant's cause. On the contrary, it helped defendant in two 
particulars: ( 1) it caused the idea to prevail that something 
more had to be proved than implied authority of Barron to 
make oral representations, that proof of express authority 
might be required; and ( 2) it influenced the computation of 
damages to such an extent that instead of applying the ordi-
nary rules of damages for breach of warranty, plaintiff's re-
covery was limited to the "money difference" between the 
Mintrate birds and the Larro birds, as provided in Exhibit C. 
Thus, instead of receiving compensation on the basis of the 
15 32 Mintrate birds aCtually lost through deaths and culling, 
damages were computed on the basis of a loss of only 1144 
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birds after deducting a number equalling the percentage of 
losses in the Larro birds. Plaintiff does not criticize this com-
putation for the reason that all normal losses not attributable 
to the feed are thereby absorbed and any possible intervening 
cause is automatically excluded from consideration. He merely 
wishes to point out that this theory was adopted and maximum 
recovery was reduced as a direct result of the admission of 
Exhibit C. 
POINT NO. VI 
THE THEORY OF DAMAGES ADOPTED BY THE 
COURT IS CORRECT. 
A. The Court correctly permitted recovery, in the ab-
sence of ascertainable market value, of the cost of replacements 
in plaintiff's flock (with deductions for added egg yield), 
plus loss of egg production during the interim before replace-
ments could be made (with deduction of cost of producing 
eggs), less amounts received from the sale of culls. 
Appellant in its brief (at pages 62-67) has taken the 
last sentence of paragraph 3 of Instruction No. 18 from its 
context in an attempt to prove that the Court allowed a 
double recovery of damages. Quoting this sentence relating 
to the loss of egg yield, appellant contends that in addition 
to the full market value of the lost chickens, plaintiff was 
permitted to recover the loss of profits from eggs which these 
chickens would have produced. This, if is submitted, is based 
on a thorough misconstruction and misinterpretation of the 
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instructions given by the Court and of the facts in the Record 
showing plaintiffs computation of his damages. The Court's 
theory of damages cannot be gathered from the one sentence 
quoted by appellant, but can only be understood from some 
of the facts in the Record and from a reading of Instructions 
No. 17 and 18 in their entirety. 
The difficulty the Court was confronted with was similar 
to that experienced by the Court in the case of S~ A. Gerrard 
Co. z·. Fricker, 42 Ar. 503, 27 P. (2d) 678 ( 1934) relied 
upon by appellant, where no precedent was available announc-
ing the rule of damages properly applicable to the destruction 
and injury to a colony of bees. The Court stated: 
"We think the rule must be the one ordinarily ap-
plied for the destruction qf or injury to personal prop-
erty in general. This rule we find is: 'Definite rules 
which will measure the extent of recovery in all cases 
even of a partic}.llar class are difficult to formulate 
owing to the consideration which must be given in 
each case to its specific and perhaps peculiar surround-
ing circumstances .. .' 17 C. J. 844, sec. 166." 
After reviewing the evidence in the light of this general prin-
ciple the Court in that case found that the damage could be 
readily computed and concluded that a measure of damages 
based upon the market value of· the colonies at the time of the 
damage could be adopted, with additional allowances for 
extra work and feeding of the bees. 
In the case at bar, Instruction No. 18, par 2 announces 
the same rule of damages to the effect that plaintiff cannot 
recover any more than 
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11an· amount that will correspond to the market value 
of the chickens which died and which were culled at 
the time and place of the death and culling thereof, or 
a reasonable time thereafter, less the amount received 
by the plaintiff for the sale of the culls.'' (Emphasis 
supplied). 
This is the basic instruction with respect to the amount of 
damages in the case at bar. It allows no recovery beyond the 
market value of the lost chickens. It does not permit any 
additional recovery for the loss of profits from the dettd 
chickens. However, in the case at bar, there was the added 
difficulty which distinguishes it from the Gerrard Co. case above 
that the market value of chickens of the ages of the Mintrate 
birds could not be directly ascertained. The evidence is un-
disputed to the effect that laying hens above the age of five 
months are not generally available on the market because at 
five months they begin to produce eggs so that people who 
have raised them to that age will not sell them then because 
they are so valuable for egg production. (See the expert 
testimony of Earl Wood R. 370-371 and of Keith Bryson 
R. 247, 258). Also, since chickens are brooded only during 
certain months of the year, even five-months old pullets are 
not available on the market at all times (R. 259). Conse-
quently the market value of the lost chickens had to be ar-
rived at by a process of indirection. The formula employed 
by the Court to this end is the same as that used by the Utah 
courts and many other courts in case of destruction of a build-
ing where there is also no ascertainable market value. 
In Egelhoff tJ, Ogden City, 71 Utah 511 (1928), for ex-
ample, the Supreme Court of Utah stated: 
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"It has been held by this court that the measure of 
damages for the destruction of a house is the r cost to 
reprodttre it, and the value of its use while that Wtl.f 
being done.' l\1arks l'. Crt/mer, 6 Utah 419 . . ." 
(Emphasis supplied). 
See also Kennedy z·. Treleaz'en, 103 Kan. 651, 275 Pac. 977, 
7 A.L.R. 274, also holding that the cost of replacing the 
building is the best measure of damages in cases of that kind, 
stating: 
"There is no universal test for determining the 
value of property injured or destroyed and the mode 
and amount of proof must be adapted to the facts 
of each case . . . 
It is frequently said that the market value of the 
property described at the time and place of the fire 
is a proper measure, and this is true if the property in 
fact has a market value. If there be no market value, 
then another criterion of value must be found, and 
the best evidence which can be obtained, must be pro-
duced to show the elements which enter into real 
value." 
This rule of damages based on replacement cost plus use 
value is not limited to the destruction of buildings, but is 
also applied in case of destruction of personal property having 
no market value. 15 Am. Jur., Damages, sec. 15. The for-
mula is the same as the measure of damages applied in many 
cases of injury to personal property. Compare, for example, 
Bergstrom v. Mellen, 57 Utah 42, 192 Pac. 679 ( 1920), and 
Metcalf v. Mellen, 57 Utah 44, 192 Pac. 676 ( 1920) holding 
that in an action for damages to an automobile recovery may 
be had for the reasonable costs of repair, plus any deprecia-
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tion m market value after repairs are completed, plus- ~he 
reasonable use of the car during the period the plaintiff was 
deprived of its use. Cf Gardner v. Airway Motor Coach Lines, 
---- Utah ____ , 166 P. (2d) 196 ( 1946). 
In accordance with these authorities, the third paragraph 
of Instruction No. 18 states that as a substitute for the market 
value of the lost hens the jury may use the "cost of replacement 
plus temporary loss of use" formula, with the necessary ad-
justments due to the fact that fiVe-months old pullets have to 
be fed and cared for for at least two months before they are 
mature, but on the other hand produce eggs for two addi-
tional months. The item of "loss of use" during the period 
before replacements can be made in the case at bar consists 
of temporary loss of egg production. 
That this element of "loss of use" for a temporary period, 
even where it takes the form of a temporary loss of profits, 
has nothing in common with a claim for loss of future profits, 
is held in Horace F. Wood Transfer Co. v. Shelton, 180 Ind. 
273, 101 N. E. 718 ( 1913) which was an action for damages 
to a carriage and a team of horses. The Court stated: 
"In its seventeenth instruction the court told the 
jury in assessing damages, if it should find fo! ~h_e 
plaintiffs, it might consider 'whether the plamtl~s 
were for any period of time deprived of the use of sa~d 
horse and cab by reason of any injury sustained to sa1d 
horse and cab in said collision, and the reasonable 
value for the use of said cab and horse during said 
period of time, all as shown by the evidence in the 
case.' This ir:str~ction is . manifes!ly not open to 
appellant's obJeCtton that tt permttted the jury to 
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(/SJeJJ J"'' . .-geJ for .wch .rpeclllt~til'e loss ,,J might tiC-
ewe in :/.·;; : :tfitrt· by reason of the lessened value of 
the injured horse and cab. Fairly interpreted, and 
especi~iity in the light of all the evidence given ~n the 
rn.1~, ti1/J iusttuction Jimply told the jm·y that Nl de-
!trmining the rpteJtion of d.IIJJdge.r. if "~'Y· it 111<(111 
co!IJ::jer the reaJ(JJJ,Jbie l'.t:':H of t/;,• !tJe of the cttb dJ!tt 
bur.L.' Juring the f'a.:ud lit t'c'JJ1iiJ' in !r/J,;c/J tO repatt' 
the injuries causeJ by the collision. There was no evi-
dence before the jury of any loss which was not past, 
certain, and known at the time of the trial;" (Emphasis 
supplied.) 
The Court also held that evidence showing that the plaintiff 
lost $5 to $7 a day for a two-months period because he was 
deprived of the use of the horse and carriage was not 
open to the objection that it sought to set up speculative profits, 
stating that it only 
"tended to show probable profits which might have 
been received not as the measure of damages, but to 
aid the jury in estimating damages." 
The three cases relied upon by appellant on pages 64-67 
of its brief are all distinguishable on the ground that the 
animals lost there had an ascertainable market value so that 
the ordinary rule of loss or depreciation of market v_alue 
could be applied. Also, there was evidence that the future 
profits claimed in those cases were truly speculative as for 
example a claim for the increase of a bee colony which, the 
court said, was "too much of a guess to be the basis of a 
claim for damages." In one of the three cases, Miller v. 
Economy Hog and Cattle Powder Co., 228 Iowa 693, 293 
N.W. 4 (1940), the Court recognized that damages might 
be recovered for the temporary loss of use by an animal, stating: 
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"The damage resulting from injury to an animal is 
the difference in value before and after the injury. There 
may be other elements of damage such as expense of 
treatment or temporary loss of use or of produce. But 
whether the animal is injured or destroyed the total 
damages ordinarily recoverable may not exceed its 
value prior thereto." (Emphasis supplied). 
McCormick on Damages ( 1935), p. 477, takes issue with the 
last sentence quoted, stating that 
"If in fact the cost of repair, including loss of use ex-
ceeds the value of the chattel, there should be no hard 
and fast rules fixing that value as the maximum re-
covery.'' 
Respondent does not have to be concerned with this rule, how-
ever, because in the first place there is no ascertainable value 
\Vhich may not be exceeded, and secondly, the total price of 
five-months old pullets if bought to replace the older and more 
valuable hens of plaintiff already amounted to $2,033.44 after 
deduction of $540.56 received for the culls so that under 
the totai verdict of $2,231.34, less than $200.00 was allowed 
to cover the temporary loss of egg production and the other 
items intended to be allowed under Instruction No. 18. (See 
Exhibit V). 
Plaintiff's summary of his computation of damages ap-
pears on the typewritten Exhibit V (introduced in evidence 
at R. 67 4) . After this document was admitted, two more 
figures were subtracted from the total-$53.94 for overhead 
saved with respect to the chickens which had died or had been 
culled (R. 691), and $1,235.52 for feeding costs saved with 
r<i:spect to the same chickens (R. 859). 
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Detailed evidence substantiating plaintiff's claim of losses 
appears on pages 527-5-B, 574-585, 654-675, and 682-691 of 
the Record. A great part of this evidence consists of testi-
mony of Mr. l\1ille~, who worked for plaintiff and personally 
made most of the entries on the daily eggcharts which contain 
complete figures on egg production and counts of chickens. 
The market price of five-months old pullets and of eggs was 
testified to by two poultry experts, Mr. Wood and Mr. 
Bryson (R. 246, 3 70). Amounts received for culls bought 
by Mr. Conta for the Utah Poultry Company were proved by 
the receipts given by that Company (R. 575-579). 
Plaintiff's computation of damages may be summarized 
as follows: 
Original number of 1\fintrate birds ________________________ 2,850 
Number left on Dec. 4, 1948 ________________________________ 1,318 
Absolute loss (including deaths and culls) __________ 1,5 32 
Number that should have been left if lost at same 
rate as Larro ------------------------------------------------------2,462 
Number actually left ---------------------------------------· ______ 1, 318 
Relative loss (in excess of Larro) ________________________ 1, 144 
Price of 1,144 pullets 5 months old at $2.25 
per pullet ------------------------· ---------------------------$2,5 7 4.00 
Minus price received for 744 culls at $0.74 
per cull -------------------------------------------------------- 540.56 
$2,033.44 
Plus cost of feeding 5-months old pullets until 
mature ----------------------------------------------------------- 822.54 
$2,855.98 
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Minus added egg yield of 5-months old pullets 1,308.90 
$1,547.08 
Plus egg loss up to assumed replacement date 
(Dec. 9, 1948) -------------------------·------------------ 1,973. 70 
$3,520.78 
Minus overhead saved on lost hens________________ 53.94 
$3,466.84 
Minus feeding costs saved on lost hens __________ 1,235.52 
$2,231.~·2 
It will be noted that this computation is in accord with In-
structions No. 17 and 18, and the additional Instruction given 
on page 859 of the Record. The arrangement of the figures 
on Exhibit V is slightly different, but the result is the same. 
It is submitted that the theory of damages adopted by the 
Court and the computation of damages thereunder is correct. 
Respondent does wish to add, however, that a recovery 
of $2,231.32 under the total verdict of the jury by no means 
compensates him for the total amount of his loss. The rea-
son is that he was unable to replace the lost hens and thereby 
minimize his damages as the Court ruled as a matter of law 
he should have done not later than December 4, 1948 (R. 538). 
That laying hens of the same age and breed as those he lost 
were not available on the market, has been pointed out before. 
It is possible that he might have been able to buy some five-
months old pullets, assuming that he could h_ave found them 
in the numbers and at the times needed and had the capital to 
purchase them. Assuming then that he could have acquired 
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younger replacement birds, he would, however, have been con-
fronted with innumerable problems of management, feeding 
and accommodation. The following January when his new crop 
of baby chicks would have come in, he would have had three 
flocks of three different ages, with the replacement birds still 
in the best part of the laying stage at a time when the new 
chicks would have been ready for egg production and re-
quired more space. As lvir. Park testified, he chose the month 
of January ~s the starting point of his business cycle after 
some years of experimentation because January chicks will 
reach the peak of egg production in October and November 
when egg prices are highest (R. 703). Then, about January 
of the next year, he starts to cull out the older flock to make 
room for the new ones. When the new ones go into the laying 
pens, more of the old hens are culled out until, about October, 
all of the flock of the preceding year has been disposed of, 
and the cycle starts again. In view of these facts, it is clear 
that the presence of a third flock would have been difficult 
and impractical for Mr. Park to handle, under the particular 
set-up of his poultry business. 
A more realistic rule of damages might have been 
to regard plaintiffs losses not like the loss of a few 
individual chickens kept by a family for its household 
use, but rather as damages suffered in his poultry busi-
ness, or, in an analogy to the loss of an annual crop, as losses 
sustained by his annual flock of chickens. Viewed in this 
fashion, damages would not be assessed upon the basis of the 
individual chickens lost, ·but rather upon the loss of egg pro-
duction over the entire laying period. Compare Cleary v. 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Shand, 48 Utah 640, 161 P. 453 ( 1916); Sharp v. Gianulakis, 
63 Utah 249, 225 P. 3·37 ( 1924); Vincent v. Federal Land 
Bank of Berkeley, 109 Utah 191, 167 P. (2d) 279 (1946). 
That profits lost as the result of the breach of warranty of 
feed for animals may be recovered similar to profits lost from 
a growing crop, is suggested in Swift & Co. v. Redhead, 147 
Iowa 94, 122 1\f.W. 140 ( 1909). Cf Miller v. Economy Hog and 
Cattle Powder Co., 228 Iowa 693, 293 N.W. 4 (1940) where 
the Court intimated that where future profits are contem-
plated as the immediate fruits of a warranty of animal feed, 
they can be recovered. 
Respondent is of the opinion that under any such theory 
under which the plaintiff's loss would be figured on the basis 
of the eggs which are the product of his business rather than 
the chickens which constitute merely his capital investment, 
he would have received a more just and fair amount of com-
pensation. The present verdict does not allow him even as 
much as the full market value of $2,574.00 for 1144 young 
pullets which are admittedly much less valuable than his mature 
laying hens. In this connection attention is called to defend-
ant's requested Instruction No. 11 (R. 70) which was not 
given, in which defendant suggests that damages be awarded 
on the basis of an imaginary market price of $2.80 per chicken, 
which would amount to a total of $3,203.20 for the 1144 
chickens lost. After deducting the $540.56 received for the 
culls the total amount of damages to be awarded would still be 
$2,662.64, well above the present verdict of $2,231.32. 
B. The evidence with respect to the temporary loss of egg 
production was sufficiently definite and certain. 
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It is true that plaintiff experienced some difficulties jn 
proving his damages. That was due to the fact that as a 
farmer, he does not keep elaborate books and he did not have 
the assistance of an accountant in preparing his figures for 
the trial. Furthermore, his proof was complicated by the 
fact that he did not pray damages for his absolute loss in 
.Mintrate birds, but solely for his relative loss in excess of 
Larro losses necessitating many computations on a percentage 
basis; and finally the theory of damages adopted by the Court 
due to the fact that the market value of the lost chickens 
could not be directly established, resulted in an involved 
method of figuring out feeding costs, overhead, egg production 
gains and losses, and similar items described above under A. 
It is submitted that the average price of $15.00 a case 
was a proper figure to use in the computation of the value of 
the eggs lost. Plaintiff did not rely on the estimate of Mr. 
Miller to that effect, as appellant claims, but the price of eggs 
was testified to by the poultry expert Mr. Keith Bryson, who 
had bought all of plaintiff's eggs (R. 245-246). 1fr. Bryson 
stated that eggs of young pullets sell for a little less, but that 
the average throughout the fall season of 1948 was $15.00 
a case (a case consisting of 30 dozen) . Plaintiff himself 
testified from the actual sales figures that he received 41.2 
cents a dozen on the average for the eggs of his young pullets 
who had just started to lay up to August 20 (R. 686, 695), 
and therafter prices went up and the eggs got larger so that 
50 cents a dozen or $15.00 a case is a fair average. Appellant 
had the opportunity to controvert this figure by bringing in 
evidence of its own, but failed to do so. 
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It is difficult to understand how appellant can claim, 
in the face of plaintiff's computation of damages showing a 
deduction of as much as $1,235.52 for savings in feeding 
costs and $53.94 for savings in overhead, that no allowance 
has been made for either one of these items (see pages 71-
74 of appellant's brief). The jury was charged specifically 
in Instruction No. 17 that in determining the temporary losses 
in egg production, plaintiff may recover "the value of the eggs 
less the cost of producing the same," and in Instruction No. 
17 the Court stated, after overhead had already been deducted 
before arriving at the total of $3,466.84 '(R. 691), that 
"the cost of. feeding hens is in evidence and it is 
necessary for you to deduct from the figure that the 
plaintiff gave you, of $3,466.84, if you find by a pre-
ponderance of the evidence that you should use such 
figures, the cost of feeding the chickens that plaintiff 
did not feed during the period that he claims he had a 
reduced egg production." 
And at page 859 of the Record the Court instructed the jury 
that plaintiff 
"would not be entitled to an egg lay without deducting 
the money he would have had to pay to feed the 
chickens,'' 
and submitted to the jury the stipulated figure of $1,235.52 
"as the plaintiff's feeding cost, leaving a balance of $2,231.~4." 
The maximum permitted recovery after deducting the 
$1,235.52 was, however, not inserted into the Instruction, 
leaving the higher maximum of $3,466.84, with the above-
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r 
quoted additional charge of Instruction No .• 17 to the effect 
that the feeding costs must still be deducted. The Document 
"Judgment on the Verdict" also carried the $3,466.84 maxi-
mum figure, listing a maximum of $1,973.70 allowable for 
egg loss. The jury, sent out with this document and with a 
figure of $L2Y:'l.52 to be deducted for feeding costs, naturally 
deducted most of the feeding cost from the amount allowed 
for the chickens, instead of from the egg loss, ending up 
correctly with a maximum verdict of $2,231.34, but allowing 
$1.672.00 for eggs and only $558.93 for chickens. Of course, 
under the theory of damages adopted by the Court a sub-
division of the damages into chicken loss and loss of egg 
yield was not necessary and might have been avoided, but 
it is submitted that the arrangement of the figures was not 
material and had not the slightest effect on the ultimate 
result of the case. 
With respect to the amount of $540.56 deducted for 
overhead, attention is called to pages 687-691 showing how 
plaintiff arrived at that figure. His feeding costs were also 
testified to at length in the tria1 ( R. 5 79-5 81, 68 7) . 
It is also submitted that in the case at bar there was noth-
ing speculative or conjectural about the evidence introduced 
to prove plaintiff's temporary loss of egg production. In 
connection with appellant's reference to the Annotation in 
99 A.L.R. 938 relating to prospective profits of new businesses, 
it may be stated that not only did plaintiff have- provable 
data of his past poultry business, but better than that, his 
egg losses could be rationally arrived at, without guessing 
or speculation, through a -comparison with the egg pro-
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duction of the Larro birds, which was a simultaneous 
absolutely equal venture. The Court found the ideal 
situation that the basis of comparison was provided by 
the plaintiff himself through the division of his flock. See 
the Annotation in 69 A.L.R. 748 ( 1930) entitled "Loss of 
or damages to crop as element of damages for breach of 
contract of sale or warranty of agricultural machinery or 
fertilizer." Some of the cases listed in this annotation refer 
to facts similar to the case at bar where, for example, de-
fective fertilizer had been used only on part of a plaintiff's 
land and not on the other. The court in a case like that held 
that the "actual experiment that was made relieved the dam-
ages of any objection based on the idea of their being specu-
lative or contingent." Wolcott v. Mount, 13 Am. Rep. 438; 
Bell v. Reynolds, 78 Ala. 511; Philbrick v. Kendall, 111 Me. 
198, 88 Atl. 540 ( 1913); and Swift & Co. v. Redhead, 147 
Iowa 94, 122 N.W. 140, stating that a claim for profits lost 
through breach of warranty in the sale of a cattle feed is 
not subject to the objection that it is speculative or uncertain. 
Finally, in answer to appellant's objection to the use of 
plaintiffs own figures, which are, however, all based on the 
egg charts introduced in evidence, the case of Stuart v. Bur-
lington County Farmers' Exchange, 101 Atl. 265 ( 1917) 
is referred to where the plaintiffs oral testimony with 
respect to the amounts of his sales of a crop and losses 
sustained was held competent evidence, and also Rabinowitz 
v. Hawthorne, ____ N.J. ____ , 98 Atl. 315 ( 1916). 
C. The procedure in the trial with respect to proof was 
not prejudicial to defendant's cattse. 
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r 
I. 
There was nothing in the procedure in the trial court 
that was prejudicial to defendant's cause. On the contrary, 
the Court was most exacting, strictly requiring plaintiff to 
make his proof of damages air tight, so that as a result 
plaintiff had to labor over his figures and problems of 
arithmetics while defendant could sit by relying on the Court 
to check the minutest details of the proof. Furthermore, 
the Court on its own, without any motion or request by de-
fendant, compelled plaintiff to make one deduction after the 
other from his claim for damages, and on one day even told 
him that a non-suit would be granted if additional .figures 
for further deductions were not brought in within five minutes 
(R. 680-681) . The Court also on its own initiative cut off 
all of plaintiff's damages after Dec. 9, 1948 (R. 538) with-
out plaintiff having an opportunity to show that it would be 
impractical and inexpedient for him to replace the lost chick-
ens before the end of their laying period in the fall of 1949. 
Reading the whole record and all the instructions .one 
cannot but receive the impression that if any side was 
helped by the Court, it was the defendant's rather than the 
plaintiffs. 
D. The Court gave complete instructions on the subject 
of intervening causes and the plaintiff's duty to minimize 
his losses. 
As has been fully discussed above under Point IV re-
lating to proximate cause, any normal losses in the Mintrate 
pens not attributable to the feed have been automatically 
excluded from consideration due to the fact that only extra-
ordinary losses, that is those exceeding Larro losses have been 
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included in plaintiffs computation of his damages. Instead 
of claiming compensation for his absolute loss of 1532 birds, 
only his relative loss of 1144 birds was considered, leaving 
the balance of ~·88 chickens (for which even younger re-
placements would have cost $8?3.00) to be written off as 
normal risks of the poultry business. 
As has also been stated before, the Newcastle disease 
did not become prevalent before November, 1948, not long 
before the cut-off date of. December 9, 1948. While appel-
lant claims that the disease broke out in the end of September 
or October, the Record clearly shows, and the egg charts 
prove, that the disease started in November, 1948 (R. 208). 
Furthermore, Newcastle losses were experienced also by the 
Larro birds, almost to the same extent as by the Mintrate 
birds which suffered slightly more because of their previously 
weakened condition caused by the defective nutrition. Con-
sequently, under the relative loss theory, very slight, if any, 
losses were counted during the period of the Newcastle 
disease.· 
The condition of "picking" has also been discussed be-
fore, particularly under Point No. IV. It suffices to repeat 
that plaintiff does take the position, and the evidence in the 
. record clearly proves, that the severe picking known as "can-
nibalism" or "pickouts," as disti~guished from the ordinary 
feather picking which occurs in most flocks from time to time 
without any serious consequences-was caused as a proximate 
result of the Mintrate feed and feeding method. Any losses 
occasioned by the cannibalism are the proximate result of 
the Mintrate feed. 
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Any intervening causes not automatically excluded 
through the relative-loss method of co~puting damages are 
covered by Instruction No. 19 which charges the jury to 
consider any contingencies or diseases peculiar to the .Min-
trate coops. 
The duty to mm1m1ze damages is fully covered by In-
struction No. 17. Also, as has been discussed before, the 
Court ruled that under his duty to minimize his losses it 
would be unreasonable as a matter of law for plaintiff to 
recover for any losses beyond December, 1948 (R. 538). 
Plaintiff spent whole days in the Mintrate pens painting the 
birds with a salve to prevent further cannibalism, with con-
siderable success. And although defendant again claims that 
he did not see a veterinarian and again fails to mention its 
own veterinarian, Dr. Sturdy, it must be repeated that Dr. 
Sturdy made a special trip from Illinois to Utah to examine 
plaintiff's birds. Dr. Sturdy, who saw that plaintiff used a 
salve to stop the picking, had no other suggestion to make 
to help this condition. According to Mr. Conta, debeaking 
is a new method used by some poultry men to alleviate this 
condition, but it does not help very much (R. 346), and it is 
certainly not the only deterrent plaintiff should have used 
to minimize his loss. 
Plaintiff did not stop using Mintrate immediately when 
he noticed its harmful effects because defendant's agent Gail 
Barron requested him to give the feed a "fair trial" (R. 150, 
420). However, when plaintiff was certain that the effects 
of the feed were becoming disastrous, he discontinued 
it immediately (R. 150). He changed back gradually to the 
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other feeding program so that by September 1, 1948, his 
chickens received no more Mintrate feed. 
Appellant contends that plaintiff could have replaced 
his damaged birds right then, in September or October, 1948. 
In this connection attention is called to the following language 
from S. A. Gerrard Co. v. Fricker, 42 Ar. 503, 27 P. (2d) 
678 ( 1934) relied on by appellant on page 64 of its· brief: 
"We know of no rule of law that requires a person 
whose property has been wrongfully injured to go into 
the open market as the court states, and buy substi-
tutes, or, as here 'other bees' in order to claim dam-
ages from the wrongdoer or to mitigate them." 
Appellant suggests on page 83 of its brief that since the whole 
flock was affected, plaintiff should have replaced his whole 
flock. Appellant further states (p. 84 of its brief) that since 
there was a ready market for chickens for meat in the fall 
of 1948, and pullets up to the age of five months of age were 
available for purchase, plaintiff should have disposed of his 
whole flock and bought a new one of younger pullets, and 
received damages for the difference. Even leaving aside the 
fact that plaintiff would then have had less valuable non-
laying chickens, plaintiff would under defendant's own theory 
of damages recover more than twice the amount of the present 
verdict: He would have spent $6,412.50 to buy 2850 five-
months old pullets at $2.25 per pullet; and assuming that 
he would have had only half of his actual losses at that time, 
or a loss of only 766 birds, he would have received only 
$1,542.16 in a sale of the remaining 2,084 chickens for 
meat at $0.74 a piece, leaving a balance to be awarded as 
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damages in the total amount of $4,870.34. This figure does 
not yet include an amount to compensate plaintiff for the 
loss of "ten or twenty days' production as a result of changing 
from one flock to another" which appellant suggests might 
also be added. 
CONCLUSION 
Respondent submits that no error was committed in the 
trial court, and that its judgment should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
LOTHAIRE R. RICH 
B. M. BODENHEIMER 
Attorneys for Respondent. 
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